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ABSTRACT
EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUPPLY NETWORK
CONFIGURATION, INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION SHARING AND
PERFORMANCE
By
MARCIA DALEY
August 2008

Committee Chair: Dr. Subhashish Samaddar
Major Department: Decision Science

Critical to the success of a firm is the ability of managers to coordinate the complex
network of business relationships that can exist between business partners in the supply
network. However many managers are unsure on how best to leverage their resources to
capitalize on the information sharing opportunities that are available in such networks.
Although there is significant research on information sharing, the area of interorganizational information sharing (IIS) is still evolving and there is limited research on
IIS in relation to systemic factors within supply networks.
To help fill this gap in the literature, a primary focus of this dissertation is on
the relationship between the design of the supply network and IIS. The design of the
supply network is characterized by the supply network configuration which is comprised
of (1) the network pattern, (2) the number of stages in the supply network, and (3) where
the firm is located in that supply network. Four different types of IIS are investigated,
herein. These types of IIS are a function of the frequency with which information is
shared and the scope of information shared. Type 1 (Type 2) IIS is the low (high)
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frequency state where only operational information is shared. Similarly, Type 3 (Type 4)
is the low (high) frequency state where strategic information is shared. The argument is
that the type of IIS varies depending on the configuration of the supply network and that
this relationship is influenced by the coordination structure established between firms in
the network.
The second focus of this dissertation deals with the relationship between IIS and
performance. Research findings on the benefits to be gained from IIS have been
ambiguous, with some researchers claiming reduced cost in the supply network with IIS,
and others finding minimal or no benefits. To add clarity to these findings, the role that
uncertainty plays in the relationship between IIS and performance is examined. The
thesis presented is that the positive relationship between IIS types and the performance of
the supply network is impacted by process uncertainty (i.e. the variability in process
outcomes and production times), and partner uncertainty.
Social network theory and transaction cost economics provide the theoretical
lens for this dissertation. A model is developed and will be empirically validated in a
cross-sectional setting, utilizing a sampling frame randomly selected and comprised of
supply management executives from various industries within the United States.

Keywords: Supply network, inter-organizational information sharing, coordination
structure, partner uncertainty, process uncertainty, supply network performance, supply
network design
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1.

INTRODUCTION

Supply networks (SNs) can involve extremely complex configurations and interdependencies
between firms that require proper coordination in order to be effective (Choi et al. 2001; Choi et
al. 2002; Lamming et al. 2000; Nassimbeni 1998). Such networks are often associated with
“lateral links, reverse loops, two-way exchanges and so on encompassing the upstream and
downstream activity, with a focal firm as the point of reference” (Lamming et al. 2000). The
supply network configuration (SNC) defines the structure of the inter-organizational arrangement
existing between transacting parties. These configurations are associated with strategic activities
that can impact the success of companies and even industries thus it is very important that supply
networks be managed properly (Fine 2000).
Supply networks offer opportunities to gain improved performance and mitigate
inefficiencies (Corbett 2001; Corbett et al. 1999; Dyer et al. 2000; Kotabe et al. 2003; Zhao et al.
2002b). To achieve these benefits, managers need to understand the causes of competitive
pressures, and be willing to implement innovative strategies to correct them (Lee et al. 1997a;
Lee et al. 1997b). Managers that are interested in having their firms included in the top echelon
of their industry must recognize that:
“Top-performing companies distinguish themselves from the ordinary by their ability to
anticipate where in the chain lucrative opportunities are likely to arise and to invest in
the capabilities and relationships to exploit them…superior market and technological
forecasting ability and superior competency portfolio management (that is, supply chain
design) are critical functions for the organization. ”(Fine 1998: 76).
One source of achieving this ‘ability to anticipate’ opportunities is inter-organizational
information sharing (IIS). Inter-organizational information sharing refers to the sharing of
information across firm boundaries, and is needed since organizations are unable to generate all
of their requisite resources internally. The information shared can be operational or strategic.
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Operational information is quantitative and is associated with short-term issues such as advanced
shipping notices, order status, production schedules and inventory levels (Moberg et al. 2002;
Van de Ven et al. 1980). Such operational information is used to make decisions which tend to
contribute incrementally to the overall long-run success of an organization (Ganesan 1994;
Mentzer et al. 2000). Strategic information, on the other hand, is firm specific, incorporates
sensitive and qualitative information, and deals with issues that have a long-term time horizon
(Mentzer et al. 2000; Moberg et al. 2002). Decisions made utilizing strategic information include
pricing strategies, new target markets, capacity allocation, outsourcing, facility layout, new
product development, distribution and promotional strategies (Moberg et al. 2002; Van de Ven et
al. 1980).
The efficiency with which information is used depends on how information is distributed
within the organization (Aoki 1986) and this logic can be extended to information distribution
across firm boundaries. Distribution is accomplished through the coordination structure, which
identifies where the locus of authority for making decisions resides and the type of information
that is available for use in the decision-making process. The coordination structure can enhance
the information sharing strategies that take place between firms in the supply network (Yu et al.
2001) by allowing these firms to manage the flow of activities (goods, services and information)
within the network more effectively (Anand et al. 1997; Dyer et al. 2000; Lee et al. 1997b).
Additional benefits to the overall network include lower costs, and increased responsiveness
(Kopczak et al. 2003; Stevenson 1994; Yu et al. 2001). This is particularly important in the
present environment where rapid technological and economic changes and the pressures of
globally competitive markets have led to increased uncertainty and complexity. Sources of this
complexity include multiple product offerings to meet the eclectic demands of customers, shorter
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product life cycles, and a multitude of interactions across firm boundaries. Concomitant with this
complexity is uncertainty due in part to imperfect information about market exchanges and
environments, and asymmetry of information owing to the unwillingness of parties to share their
private information (Clarke 1983).
Uncertainty is one of the key variables used to explain organizational behavior (March et
al. 1958) and is a prominent construct in many of the organization, marketing and strategy
theories. Proponents of Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson 1985) argue that the presence
of internal or external uncertainty exacerbates the limited information processing and
communication ability of human actors and results in high transaction costs, which ultimately
impacts the type of governance structure used to conduct economic activities. External
uncertainty can result from unpredictable environments or technology while internal uncertainty
is reflected in information asymmetry and performance evaluation problems.
According to Knight (1964), uncertainty exists where the decision-maker is unable to
assign probabilities when confronted with random events, and this has also been expressed as:
“a property of the decision environment within which transactions take place and refers
in a general sense to a situation in which the relevant contingencies cannot be spelled out ex
ante” (Heide et al. 1995).

Since probabilities cannot be assigned to the outcomes of the states of nature, adaptation
mechanisms are required in order to offset some of the potential costs associated with these
situations.
Fortunately, IIS can mitigate the impact of uncertainty which has been identified as one
of the primary drivers of inefficiencies, such as the “bull whip” effect, in the supply network
(Lee et al. 1997b). The “bull-whip” effect occurs when there is a lack of collaboration as
information flows through the supply network and can contribute to discrepancies between
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orders to the suppliers and sales to the buyers. These distortions tend to amplify as the number of
intermediaries in the supply network increase resulting in demand patterns that are much less
predictable to upstream members of the supply chain.
Although IIS can lead to improved performance of the supply network (Cachon et al.
2000; Chen 1998; Gavirneni et al. 1999; Lee et al. 2000a), reaping the potential strategic benefits
from using external resources requires that managers realize that:
“No corporation is an island. Every company is dependent on others in large supply
chains and distribution chains. As a result, limiting strategy to within the corporate enterprise is
as meaningless as the purported boundaries of such entities” (Fine 1998).
The transition from a focus on intra-organizational to inter-organizational strategies, particularly
as it relates to supply networks, is filled with many challenges. Some firms (Home Depot, WalMart, and JC Penney) have, however, been successful at implementing strategies that can
effectively capitalize on external resources. For example, Wal-Mart, recognized as an innovative
leader in the retail industry, shares point-of-sale (POS) information with its suppliers and
transmits orders electronically to the relevant supplier when inventory for an item falls to a
predetermined minimum level of stock (Lancioni et al. 2000).
Implementation of these strategies presents a real challenge for many firms and can lead
to inertia unless managers are given the proper guidance enabling available resources to be
channeled to the appropriate knowledge and information sharing activities.

1.1

Problem Statement
Critical to the success of a firm is the ability of managers to coordinate the complex

network of business relationships that can exist between business partners in the supply network
(Drucker 1998; Lambert et al. 2000). Despite the acclaimed benefits that can be derived from
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IIS, firms that are actively participating in IIS are in the minority. In fact, the vast majority of
firms have been unable to fully leverage these capabilities in their supply chains. Although 9 out
of 10 business and IT executives surveyed by InformationWeek Research (McDougall 2001)
believe that collaboration will increase sales, and 50% that it will result in lower costs, only 13%
of these companies are actually sharing such point-of-sale data, and only 37% share information
with suppliers on a regular basis.
The notion that IIS improves supply network performance, as discussed earlier, has wide
support in the literature (Sahin et al. 2002). Some studies using analytical models show that
information sharing results in higher performance (Gavirneni et al. 1999) while others base their
conclusions on empirical studies (Dyer 1996; Jap 2001) where improvements are observed in the
firm’s competitive advantage as well as its economic performance. However, current research on
the link between IIS and the performance of firms has not been conclusively established. A few
researchers point to incremental improvements (Cachon et al. 2000), while other researchers
(Clarke 1983; Graves 1999) find inadequate support for such arguments.
Based on the purported benefits that can be derived from IIS, it is expedient that firms
capitalize on the information sharing opportunities that are available. But the question naturally
arises on how to accomplish this without having some understanding of the dynamics that make
it a feasible task. Although there is burgeoning literature that addresses information sharing, the
area of IIS is still evolving and is more focused on studies that examine how sociological
characteristics such as trust, and commitment influence inter-organizational behavior. Clearly
these are important attributes, and studies along this vein have helped significantly in
illuminating inter-firm dynamics inclusive of information sharing.
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Extant literature has however paid far less attention to the impact of systemic factors on
IIS. Currently, there exists limited theoretical research development to assist organizations in
dealing with this phenomenon. Storey (2002) has argued for pragmatic approaches that focus on
some of the challenges faced in managing supply networks and has suggested further study on
topics such as the structure, and processes associated with supply chain management. These are
areas that offer rich research opportunities for academics to reduce the current gap in the
literature, and provide guidance to managers as they struggle with the challenges associated with
managing their dynamic supply networks.
A better understanding of IIS, one of the key processes associated with an interorganizational relationship (IR), can be gleaned by incorporating the framework suggested by
Van de Ven (1986) where such relationships are assessed from the standpoint of social action
systems. According to Van de Ven, this assessment is germane to an IR due to the following
three characteristics which are commonly found in collective behavior:
1)

Members behave so as to achieve collective and self-interest goals.

2)

There is interdependence between members.

3)

The IR can function as a unit with an identity that is unique and different from
that of its members.

Van de Ven describes these systems in terms of situational, structural, process and outcome
factors. Situational factors are used to examine why and how inter-organizational relationships
are formed. Structural factors explore the governance mechanisms associated with different
inter-organizational structures and their relationships. Process factors describe the flow of
information and resources between involved parties. Information flow is concerned with the
transmission of messages between members and is needed to maintain and integrate the IR
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activities while resource flow deals with any valued transaction of tangible (e.g. money,
equipment) or intangible (e.g. goodwill, prestige, technical assistance) resource between units.
The outcome factors measure the effectiveness of the relationship.
A modified version of this framework is presented by focusing on the supply network
configuration (structural factor) that influences IIS (process factor) and ultimately impacts
supply network performance (outcome). Situational factors are excluded since the focus is on
inter-organizational relationships that are already in effect. Trust, although extremely important
in interorganizational settings is not explicitly examined in this study. The assumption is that
trading parties will, at a minimum, enter into cooperative relationships where operational
information is shared. This is a strong indicator that trust exists (Axelrod 1984; McAllister
1995).
Several studies on supply network design (Beamon 1998; Choi et al. 2002; Fisher 1997;
Harland et al. 2001) have been conducted, but how it relates to IIS has not been empirically
established in the literature. The primary purpose of this study is to address this gap in the
literature by taking a more holistic approach and examine the impact of the supply network
configuration on IIS. We depart from the predominant conceptualization of IIS in the literature
as a uni-dimensional construct, and instead classify IIS using the two-dimensional typology
developed by Samaddar et al (2004) –(See Appendix A) that considers both the scope (or type)
of information shared (operational vs. strategic), and the frequency of IIS (low vs. high).
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1.2

Research Question
This research effort investigates the following questions:
•

What impact does the configuration of the supply network have on IIS?

•

How does the coordination structure influence the relationship between the
configuration of the supply network and IIS?

•

What is the role of uncertainty in the relationship between IIS and performance?

This study employs the survey research design method (a non-experimental design
approach), and quantitative techniques to investigate the factors that influence IIS and ultimately
supply network performance. Traditionally, empirical research on IIS has adopted the firm or the
dyad as the unit of analysis. In this dissertation the above questions1 are investigated from a
broader perspective than is customary in the stream of research on IIS, by extending the inquiry
to the supply network comprised of the focal firm and its upstream and downstream partners.

1.3

Plan of the Dissertation
The remainder of the dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter 2 provides the

theoretical framework for this study and reviews relevant prior research. In Chapter 3 the
theoretical model of the study and related hypotheses are presented. Chapter 4 describes the
design and methodology to be used for the empirical portion of the study. Chapter 5 discusses
the measurement validation and data analysis. Chapter 6 concludes the study.

1

See also Samaddar, Nargundkar, and Daley 2006
-8-

2.

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter, theoretical perspectives from the organizational economics and sociology
literature that guide and inform this research on IIS are examined by drawing on the body of
literature in Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and Social Network Theory. Neither of these
theoretical lenses is unilaterally adequate, but together they offer unique insights and
complementary arguments to build a solid conceptual foundation for the research hypotheses
developed in Chapter 3.
TCE is valuable to this research as it provides guidance on why certain transactions occur
within the firm while others take place outside the boundaries of the firm. It also addresses how
firms in hybrid (e.g. buyer-supplier) relationships can utilize formal (written contracts, dispute
resolution bodies, hostage exchanges) and informal governance mechanisms such as trust to
manage these inter-organizational arrangements. The primary focus of TCE is on dyadic
relationships; however, the study of many buyer-supplier relationships cannot be confined to
these exchanges but needs to extend to the network within which they are embedded. The
network perspective as provided by Social Network theory goes beyond the economic
perspective offered by TCE to consider the interactions in the supply network from a social
context. It thus provides an explanation for why firms in supply networks may choose to share
information even though economic considerations would suggest otherwise.
Following the theoretical framework discussion, extant academic literature on
information sharing is reviewed.
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2.1

Transactions Cost Economics (TCE) theory
Coase (1937) originally developed TCE theory to explain the existence of firms and how

integration impacted costs and benefits. His conceptualization of the firm superseded that of
neoclassical economists who viewed the firm as a production function in which markets were
frictionless and information costless. Instead, he argued that there were costs associated with
using the price mechanism and that these costs which were later called “transaction costs” made
organizing activities within the firm a more efficient choice. Costs include those due to
performing safeguarding, adaptation and evaluation activities.
Williamson (1975; Williamson 1985; Williamson 1991) extended this theory to predict
governance structures based on efficiency considerations. According to Williamson’s (1991)
discriminating alignment hypothesis “transactions which differ in their attributes are aligned with
governance structures, which differ in their costs and competencies” in a manner that minimizes
transaction costs. Clearly, there are rational economic reasons for deciding on how transactions
are governed. Two ends of the governance continuum are market and hierarchy with various
“networked structures” in between these two endpoints (Powell 1990). The choice of the
appropriate governance structure depends on three attributes of a transaction: asset specificity,
uncertainty, and transaction frequency. Of these, asset specificity is considered to be the most
important attribute influencing governance structure (Grossman et al. 1986; Williamson 1975;
Williamson 1979). TCE predicts that exchanges that involve high asset specificity, uncertain
conditions, and recur frequently will be internalized within a hierarchical governance structure.
Conversely exchanges that involve low asset-specificity, stable conditions, and are non-repetitive
will be more aligned with a market governance structure. Hybrid structures are recommended
when these attributes are present to a moderate degree.
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In the context of a supply network, the transaction is the sharing of information (an asset)
between firms that are independent entities. For some firms, transactions between buyers and
suppliers involve arms-length relationships typically found in a market governance structure. The
market governance structure is characterized by a low degree of vertical coordination, with
decentralized control through the price mechanism. In this traditional “arms-length” approach,
market transactions are discrete, entailing relationships that are short-term (Ring et al. 1992) and
involve products that are standardized. Minimal information sharing is required in these
situations. For instance, at the Big Three automobile manufacturing companies, Internet
exchanges (e.g. electronic auctions) are used to purchase some commodity items (Flynn et al.
2001).
Today, the trend is towards more collaboration and information sharing in buyer/supplier
relationships (Handfield et al. 1999a; Hoyt et al. 2000). These networked (or hybrid) structures
include joint ventures, alliances, franchising and licensing agreements, and inter-firm networks
in which “parties to the transaction maintain autonomy but are bilaterally dependent to a
nontrivial degree” (Williamson 1991). With networked structures contracting transactions may
be recurrent or relational (Ring et al. 1992). As described by Ring and Van de Ven (1992) the
former are relatively short-term with repeated exchanges that have moderate degrees of
transaction specificity and ones where the terms of the exchanges are fairly certain except for
some contingencies that are resolved after the contract agreement date. The information shared
includes information that is not openly available to the public and requires the addition of private
information in order to have value to a firm such as production schedules. By contrast, the
relational contracting transactions entail highly specified long-term investments in which it is
virtually impossible to fully specify trading conditions ex ante and ones in which the exposure to
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trading hazards is very high (Ring et al. 1992). For the latter transactions, vertical integration is
not a viable option to safeguard these idiosyncratic assets in supply networks owing to raison
d’être such as economies of scale from sharing inputs, and opportunities for learning from
external exchange partners.
In order to safeguard the assets and reduce the potential for opportunistic behavior, two
possible options can be considered. Firstly, if there is a high degree of trust and commitment
between all transacting parties, they can behave as if they are one firm, working jointly in order
to achieve goals that are mutually beneficial. Alternatively, one firm may exercise control over
the other firms in the exchange relationship. For example one firm (a buyer or supplier) may
control key procedures and have the power to make decisions for the whole SN on issues such as
product design and quality control. In both of these scenarios the contract can be less complete
(Williamson 1991), but the operational and coordination costs to make these relationships
function effectively are high (Gurbaxani et al. 1991). This “single organization perspective”
contrasts with the “nexus of contract” perspective found in markets where each firm is concerned
with maximizing its own profit (Whang 1995). Information that has high security concerns such
as proprietary information would be handled in these quasi-vertical integration structures.
TCE has been used extensively in the literature to study inter-firm relationships
(Balakrishnam et al. 1993; Dyer et al. 2003; Heide et al. 1990; Pfeffer et al. 1978; Stump et al.
1996) and thus has relevance to this present study on IIS in supply networks. Two major
components of transaction costs are coordination costs and transaction risks (Clemons et al.
1993). The costs associated with exchanging information, and utilizing that information in
decision processes are denoted as coordination costs. These costs have also been referred to as
information costs (Choudhury et al. 1997). Transaction risks occur when the behavior of
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transacting parties ex post is not in keeping with ex ante agreements. The likelihood of these
risks increases when there is information asymmetry.
A discussion of the three attributes of a transaction (asset specificity, uncertainty and
transaction frequency) follows:
Asset specificity
Asset specificity refers to the extent to which investments made to support a particular
transaction (idiosyncratic investments) have a higher value than if they were switched to
alternative transactions (Lonsdale 2001). Types of asset specificity include 1) sites in which for
example, a physical plant is located in close proximity to a raw material source in order to reduce
inventory and shipping costs; 2) physical assets such as customized parts needed to produce an
item; 3) dedicated assets, which are separate investments made solely to facilitate the request of
one customer; 4) human asset attributed to learning by doing; 5) brand name capital; 6) temporal;
and 7) information specificity, which is “the extent to which the value of information is restricted
to its use and/or acquisition by specific individuals [knowledge specificity] or during specific
time periods [time specificity]” (Choudhury et al. 1997).
As asset specificity increases it creates bilateral dependency, and with that the need for
more coordinated responses to any disturbance, however disagreements and self-interested
bargaining prohibit timely and simple responses leading to maladaptation costs (Williamson
1991). This can occur, for instance, when circumstances change and requests for adaptation by
one party in a dyadic relationship, is met with unreasonable demands by the other party who
realizes that the partner is locked-in to the arrangement owing to high switching costs
(Rindfleisch et al. 1997; Williamson 1996). Parties can institute measures ex ante to prevent one
party from behaving opportunistically but these measures incur safeguarding costs. Alternatively,
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if all parties to the relationship invest in specific assets there is little incentive for opportunism
due to the existence of reciprocal dependence (Dyer 1996).
Uncertainty
External and internal conditions create uncertainty that can affect how transactions are
conducted between parties. Williamson (1985) attributes some of this uncertainty to exogenous
“disturbances” and makes a distinction between (1) environmental or external uncertainty, (2)
organizational and (3) strategic uncertainty (Williamson 1985; Williamson 1989).
Environmental uncertainty, which is external to the relationship, is caused by an inability
to anticipate ex ante the exchange conditions that arise from random acts of nature. This results
in adaptation problems and increased transaction costs, owing to the difficulties associated with
alterations to existing agreements as environmental conditions change. In contrast, both
organizational uncertainty and strategic (or behavioral) uncertainty are internal to the
relationship. Organizational uncertainty arises when there is asymmetric information between
decision makers and communication does not flow in a timely manner. This is caused by the
limited information capacity and bounded rationality of decision makers. Strategic uncertainty
occurs when there is strategic misrepresentation, nondisclosure, disguise or distortion of
information (Williamson 1989: 144) which leads to the inability to monitor ex post behavior of
transacting parties (Rindfleisch et al. 1997) creating performance evaluation problems. A
combination of uncertainty and opportunism can lead to information impactedness, that is,
transacting parties have asymmetric information and there are high costs associated with
providing the same level of information to all parties.
The impact that uncertainty has on the choice of governance structure is only relevant
when there is asset specificity. As uncertainty increases, market governance becomes less
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desirable owing to the high haggling and maladaptation costs, thus rendering hybrid and
hierarchical governance structures more suitable (Williamson 1985). When however uncertainty
reaches a high level, the midrange of asset specificity, where hybrid governance is the best
choice, diminishes and may ultimately disappear. This is attributed to the requirement for mutual
assent in the case of hybrid adaptations as opposed to unilaterally (with market governance) or
by fiat for hierarchy (Williamson 1991). Consequently in situations of high uncertainty both
hierarchical and market governance are better alternatives than hybrid governance.
The results from studies investigating the role of environmental uncertainty on
governance are ambiguous. Some studies show that under certain circumstances environmental
uncertainty increases the likelihood that firms will vertically integrate (Walker et al. 1987) while
other studies indicate that it can decrease the likelihood (Harrigan 1986). Much of these
inconsistencies have been attributed to how the environmental uncertainty construct is
operationalized in empirical studies (Rindfleisch et al. 1997). Internal uncertainty on the other
hand is not subject to these ambiguities and has been supported in many empirical studies.
TCE’s treatment of internal uncertainty provides useful insights into its influence on
performance when information is shared across firm boundaries. In the context of the supply
network, internal uncertainty can arise from the difficulty a buyer has in monitoring ex post the
behavior of a supplier and ascertaining whether obligations will be met consistently as per the
agreement. The TCE perspective suggests that while IIS can lead to improved performance of a
SN, uncertainty arising from not knowing how the partner will behave, or the reliability of
processes and their capabilities ex post (discussed in Section 2.5) lead to suboptimal decisions,
which are costly.

- 15 -

Transaction frequency
Transaction frequency refers to the rate of recurrence for transactions between specific
parties. The importance of transaction frequency on the choice of governance structure depends
on asset specificity (Williamson 1985). Hierarchy is more efficient when transactions are
recurrent and require highly specified assets. With frequent transactions, the transfer of tacit
knowledge is enhanced (Jones et al. 1997; Williamson 1991) and parties are less likely “to seek a
narrow advantage in any particular transaction” (Williamson 1985). On the other hand, the
preference is for market governance when transactions occur infrequently or when they occur
frequently but asset specificity is low. In the latter case, continuous attention and the bureaucratic
costs associated with hierarchical governance is unnecessary.
While only a few empirical studies have examined transaction frequency, it has relevance
to supply networks owing to the nature of transactions between network members. Where
transactions occur frequently and there are highly specified assets it is expected that supply
network members will establish relational contracts where there is a high level of trust and
commitment.
Two behaviors contribute to the preference for exchange transactions occurring in
hierarchies rather than in firms when conditions of high asset specificity, uncertainty and
recurring transactions: bounded rationality and opportunism (Williamson 1975; Williamson
1985).
Bounded rationality
Humans have limitations to their cognitive and computational ability that prevent them
from being able to arrive at the optimal decision in most situations despite their best intentions to
behave rationally (Simon 1947). Owing to this bounded rationality, that is inherent in humans, it
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is more difficult for firms to negotiate contracts that are truly comprehensive as not only are the
outcomes uncertain but the complexity involved makes it virtually impossible to specify all
eventualities ex ante. To deal with these limitations, contracts between a buyer and supplier, for
instance, often a) include clauses that allow them to renegotiate in the event that conditions are
different than those that maintained when the contract was initially signed, or b) are open-ended
enough to facilitate interpretations that are relevant to the existing situations. Under these
circumstances, the best alternative is to internalize transactions within the firm thus eliminating
the need for complex contracts and the associated bargaining costs to arrive at consensus.
Opportunism
One of the central tenets of TCE theory is opportunism, defined by Williamson as “selfinterest seeking with guile”. Opportunism involves the “propensity for mutually reliant parties to
mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate or otherwise confuse” for purposes of wealth expropriation
(Williamson 1985). Although not necessarily true for all individuals, opportunistic behavior is so
costly to identify ex ante that TCE presumes its existence and proposes that firms protect
themselves against the likelihood of its occurrence in their interactions with other firms.
Opportunistic behavior is possible when all transacting parties do not have access to the
private information possessed by some. This information asymmetry can be exhibited either ex
ante (adverse selection) or ex post (moral hazard) the transaction. Such opportunistic behavior by
one party, which sometimes occurs in a buyer-supplier relationship, reduces the motivation to
share information and to fully commit to that relationship. Consequently, it is extremely difficult
to coordinate activities and to reap the performance benefits of joint cooperative effort (Jap,
2001).
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Adverse selection is shown, for example, in the following summary concerning Lear
Corporation’s behavior in their relationship with Motor Company:
“..Ford wanted to form long term relationships with a few suppliers. One key element in
the new car model was the seats. In the case of the new Taurus, Ford decided to outsource the
whole process to one single supplier, Lear Corporation. As it turned out, in promising to design
and manufacture seats for two sedans, a station wagon and a high-performance model, Lear
deliberately committed to a contract they knew they would not be able to fulfill. Among other
problems, Lear had a severe shortage of engineering talent…..According to Ford, Lear missed
deadlines, failed to meet weight and price objectives and furnished parts that did not work”
(Walton 1997; Wathne et al. 2000).
The risk of opportunism is magnified under situations in which small numbers bargaining
problems (i.e., limited exchange alternatives available) are present (Williamson 1979). If a buyer
for instance has only few alternate sources of supply it is easier for the current supplier to make
unreasonable demands or charge exorbitant prices (Dutta et al. 1995; Rindfleisch et al. 1997). A
buyer, on the other hand, may be the one with the power and this can also lead to bargaining
problems leaving very few alternatives open to the seller in the event that the buyer wants to
sever the present arrangement (Pisano 1990).
To provide safeguards against the hazards of opportunistic behavior, TCE recommends a
hierarchical governance structure where better capabilities exist for monitoring and surveillance
of activities and one can “settle many disputes by appeal to fiat”(Williamson 1975). In real life
other governance structures may be preferable to a hierarchical form when other factors such as
strategic concerns, which has been ignored by TCE, and production costs which have been given
scant attention in much of the empirical studies are considered (Bello et al. 1997).
While the emphasis of the TCE framework on opportunism has been criticized by many
researchers (Ghoshal et al. 1996; Rindfleisch et al. 1997; Uzzi 1997) its occurrence both ex post
and ex ante is far from isolated in supply networks, consequently it is germane to the present
study. For a fuller discussion on opportunism in interfirm relationships see (Wathne et al. 2000).
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In addition to concerns on TCE’s predictive capability under some scenarios and the
emphasis on opportunism, one of the fundamental issues is its inadequacy to explain interorganizational relationships. Scholars have noted that TCE ignores the role that social relations
play in shaping organizational behavior by basing arguments solely on economic considerations
(Granovetter 1985). In other words:
“By neglecting the dependence of meaning on interaction and the generation of
perception, understanding, and preference by interaction, TCE neglects what may be the most
crucial feature of transactions. This feature derives not from the isolated transaction but the
transaction relation in which it is embedded” (Nooteboom 1992).
Thus although TCE alludes to the influence of social relations (Williamson 1975) this
aspect is not pursued aggressively as it is construed to be an exception rather than the norm
(Granovetter 1985).
Another point of contention is the range of relationships for which TCE is applicable.
Extensions to the TCE framework consider bilateral relationships (Williamson 1991), however,
by not going beyond dyadic relationships the theory gives “short shrift” to network relations
(Williamson 1994). Situations such as the manner used by a buyer to effectuate centralized
control over multiple tiers of suppliers may be appropriately considered in terms of a series of
dyadic relationships (Choi et al. 2001). Even so, the nature of dyadic relationships cannot be
assumed in all instances to inductively apply to the network (Anderson et al. 1994; Wathne et al.
2004).
TCE requires a complementary theoretical lens that considers the social context of
relationships, and the influence that these relationships have on overall performance in order to
provide plausible arguments for these hypotheses. To do this, the TCE perspective is integrated
with social network theory, an approach that has been used in several network studies (Jones et
al. 1997; Wu et al. 2004) and one that provides a powerful framework to explicate IIS between
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transacting parties within supply networks. In particular, the strength-of-ties literature is utilized
to help explain why ties are built between exchange parties.
2.2

Social Network Theory
Originally developed to examine how an individual’s behavior is influenced by

embeddedness, social network theory has since been extended to include organizations (Burt
1982; Dyer 1996). Embeddedness is characterized as a ‘logic that shapes motives and
expectations and promotes coordinated adaptation’ (Uzzi 1996). Early research focused on
techniques to effectively capture social relationships, while the focus in later work was more on
understanding the key dimensions associated with the characteristics of social structure.
These structures, defined as ‘the arrangement of the differentiated elements that can be
recognized as the patterned flow of information in a communication network (Rogers et al.
1981), are more useful in explaining the behavior of an exchange partner than more formal
hierarchical structures. According to Uzzi (1996), there are significant differences between the
logic of exchange found in social networks and the economic logic associated with market
behavior. Consistent with this line of reasoning, social network theory (SNT) argues that
economic actions are best understood within the social context in which they are embedded and
such actions can be influenced by the network structure and position of actors in social networks
(Gulati 1998; Gulati et al. 1998; Oliver 1996; Uzzi 1996).
The search for information to reduce uncertainty is one of the primary drivers of
organizational action (Granovetter 1985). When organizations form networks, for instance, they
can get this information. The benefits of networks can be more fully understood by examining
two mechanisms: relational and structural embeddedness (Granovetter 1992).
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Relational embeddedness, the logic of exchange that develops when a relational bond
forms between social actors, can explain how information sharing activities are impacted by this
bond (Granovetter 1973; Uzzi 1999). These bonds (or ties) form when resources (e.g. data,
information, goods) are exchanged. The strength of these ties are on a continuum from weak to
strong and depend on a “combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the
intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the ties”
(Granovetter 1973). Granovetter (1973) suggests that when social actors are linked by direct
connections, strong ties develop. With these ties, a high degree of closeness and reciprocity
results and creates an environment in which fine-grained information is shared. In such situations
it is more likely that actors will trust each other, be more willing to develop and share common
information which ultimately reduces uncertainty (Gulati 1995; Podolny 1994). Strong ties
provide a unique source of information concerning the capabilities and the reliability of the
partners. Additionally, strong ties increase the probability that social actors will share sensitive
information and work jointly on problem-solving. The potential for opportunistic behavior, as
presumed in TCE, is dramatically reduced under these situations.
Weak ties represent links between parties that interact infrequently (Granovetter 1973). In
these situations, there is more non-redundant information available, providing opportunities to
gain access to more diverse and a larger amount of information. However, weak ties are not
effective at transferring information where there is some ambiguity and uncertainty, or where
there is a mismatch between the prior knowledge possessed by exchange partners (Nahapiet et al.
1998). It is expected, therefore, that the sharing of strategic information is most likely to occur
when there are strong ties between exchange partners and these interactions will occur much
more frequently than in relationships that are not as tightly connected.
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Structural embeddedness refers to the structural positions that actors occupy in a network
(Burt 1982). Several studies have shown that where firms are located in an inter-organizational
network can influence both firm behavior and the resulting outcomes (Powell et al. 1996; Walker
et al. 1997). Any advantage that a firm has because of where it is located in the network results
in social capital which is defined as:
“the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, available through, and
derived from the network of relationships possessed by an individual or social unit” (Nahapiet et
al. 1998).

Although actors may have similar positions they may not be tied together but may be
instead tied to the “same set of other actors or to similar sets of other actors”(Gulati et al. 1998).
For instance, in cases where there are multiple suppliers for a product or service, each supplier
may interact with a totally different set of exchange partners. In these arrangements suboptimal
exchanges may occur since actors transact with those trusting partners in their social circle and
are not linked to those that can provide the most benefit. This disconnect represents a structural
hole that provides an opportunity for a third party to take a position between the disconnected
parties (Burt 1992; Burt 1997). It is likely that this third party who is in a more central position
will have greater control over information flows and access to information thereby gaining
greater influence over the other actors. The result is that in a supply network, a focal company
can utilize multiple disconnected parties upstream and downstream with whom direct links have
been established to gain control and information above that available to others. This is also true
for a first tier supplier that can utilize its position which has direct links to both the focal
company and the second tier suppliers to its advantage.
The complementary perspectives provided by TCE and social network theory allow an
integrative approach for developing the theoretical framework in this study. The absence or low
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incidence of opportunistic behavior in some collaborative relationships between the independent
firms comprising the supply network, and the presence at times of governance structures contrary
to that predicted by TCE’s discriminating alignment hypothesis begs for alternative explanations
beyond those offered by TCE. Social network theory, by considering the social context within
which exchanges occur, allows plausible explanations for IIS phenomena that cannot be
explained solely by efficiency concerns, the cornerstone of the TCE perspective.

2.3

Literature Review – Information Sharing
Inter-organizational Information sharing (IIS) involves the sharing of information across

firm boundaries and is needed so that firms involved in such relationships can compete
effectively in their environment (Yuchtman et al. 1967). Knowledge, an intangible resource has
been identified as the most critical competitive asset that the firm possesses (Grant 1996).
Intricately tied in with knowledge is information, which is an asset that also provides competitive
advantage to organizational networks when it is shared.
There are multiple views on the nature of information. Several researchers have
attempted to distinguish between data, information, and knowledge. For instance, data is defined
as “structured records of transactions”, and information as “data that makes a difference …..by
changing the way that the receiver perceives something”. Knowledge is viewed as being at a
higher level and is defined as:
“ a fluid mix of framed experience, values, contextual information, and expert insight that
provides a framework for evaluating and incorporating new experiences and information. It
originates and is applied in the minds of knowers. In organizations, it often becomes embedded
not only in documents or repositories but also in organizational routines, processes, practices,
and norms.” (Davenport et al. 1998)

In this perspective, the progression is from data to information to knowledge.
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Others however argue that in order to make sense of data and create relevant information
one has to have knowledge, thus reversing the order of progression. Still another view is that
knowledge is always evolving and is actually what occurs in-between data and information, and
previous knowledge and belief (Wood 2002). Notwithstanding the merits of these differing
philosophical views this manuscript adopts the stance of several researchers (Alavi et al. 2001;
Bartol et al. 2002; Earl 2001) who make no distinction but instead treat knowledge as:
“information possessed in the mind of individuals: it is personalized information (which
may or may not be new, unique, useful, or accurate) related to facts, procedures, concepts,
interpretations, ideas, observations, and judgments” (Alavi et al. 2001).

Within the purview of this definition IIS is envisioned as the sharing across firm
boundaries of personalized information, and one that incorporates data as well as experiences
and judgment. IIS can result in a more efficient flow of goods and services (Anand et al. 1997;
Dyer et al. 2000; Lee et al. 1997b), thus enabling better coordination and planning (Lee et al.
2000b) in inter-organizational networks. This benefits the overall network and is therefore an
important concept that should be fully understood.
IIS has generated considerable interest across several research streams including
economics, operations research, marketing, and strategic management. Several themes have
emerged from these streams:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Private information and incentives to share
Perspectives on information sharing
Influence of uncertainty on information sharing
Information distortion
Performance implications of information sharing
Role of coordination structure
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2.3.1

Private Information and the Incentives to Share
There has been a rich stream of research on information sharing in the economics

literature. Much of this research has focused on the incentives to share private information by
firms operating in oligopoly markets where firms behave as Cournot competitors by setting
quantities (Clarke 1983; Farmer 1994; Gal-Or 1986; Hwang 1994; Li 1985; Novshek et al. 1982;
Shapiro 1986; Ziv 1993), or as Bertrand competitors by setting prices (Spulber 1995), or a
comparison of both the Cournot and Bertrand strategies (Gal-Or 1985). In many cases concern
centered on whether or not the sharing of information led to collusion and how the resulting
dynamics affected consumer surplus and social welfare.
There is some reluctance by transacting parties to share all the available information
(Clarke 1983; Gal-Or 1985; Li 2002). Some of this reluctance has been attributed in the context
of a supply network to three reasons: 1) decreasing marginal value of the information shared, i.e.
as higher levels of information are shared the value derived from each additional unit shared is
less, 2) loss of relative bargaining power by one party, and 3) fear of leakage of information to
competitors, which can affect the competitive position of the buyer or the supplier in relation to
their industry rivals (Seidmann et al. 1998).
For instance, Clarke (1983) demonstrates using an analytical framework that universal
information sharing will not take place in a competitive world. Information sharing according to
this researcher will only occur in situations where firms have perfect information or where they
are completely ignorant and indifferent to pool sharing. He shows that firms can improve their
profits if those with more accurate information share it. However since this information gives
those possessing it an advantage, there has to be some incentive for sharing, such as a monetary
payment. Once firms behave cooperatively, then profits of the industry, as a whole will improve
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with information sharing and joint action. Society as a whole benefits when information is shared
between competing firms unless this information sharing leads to collusion.

2.3.2

Perspectives on Information Sharing
Ineffective IIS can lead to “misunderstandings, incorrect strategies, and mutual feelings

of frustration” (Etgar 1976), consequently decisions regarding IIS are very important. However
questions still remain on the best strategies to optimize supply network performance in light of
the barriers to effective IIS. High lock-in costs oftentimes arising from huge investments and
commitment make it difficult to change IIS decisions. Thus two critical decisions that transacting
parties must address prior to the actual sharing of information across firm boundaries are a) the
nature of the information to share (i.e. what to share) and b) the manner in which this sharing
will take place (i.e. how to share). Several perspectives have been used to assess IIS but to date
none of these have addressed both of these dimensions simultaneously.
Perspectives used include the degree or amount of information shared (Aviv 2002;
Gavirneni et al. 1999), the scope of information shared (Seidmann et al. 1998) and the level of
intensity of the relationship between partners (Spekman et al. 1998).
Seidmann and Sundararajan (1998) identify four levels of IIS that can exist in virtually
integrated organizations, such as across firm boundaries, where advances in information
technology enable coordination of information flows between partners. These levels are labeled
as transactional, operational, strategic, and strategic and competitive. Each higher level
incorporates information from the lower levels. The lowest level involves the exchange of only
transactional type of information such as prices and order quantities utilizing EDI or similar
technology. At this transactional level, no advantage is gained from information sharing related
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to firm-specific operations, since the focus is on logistic process improvements, which can be
accomplished effectively by each partner acting independently. The next level incorporates the
sharing of operational information, which usually occurs in situations where another partner can
more effectively utilize valuable information possessed by one partner, since the receiving
partner has the requisite expertise and/or resources. For instance, the use of a VMI system
facilitates the transfer of the responsibility for inventory management from the buyer to a
supplier who has more experience managing large product inventories and has first-hand
knowledge of the production schedule for the products.
The sharing of information leads to strategic benefits, in addition to operational benefits,
above the second level. At the third level, the information shared has minimal value to the
partner owning the information but can provide strategic benefits when used by another party
and also operational benefits for the donating partner. This is evidenced when a supplier is given
access to a retailer’s POS data of all product sales from that supplier. Such information allows
the supplier to increase demand forecasting accuracy, and gather information on sales patterns.
As a result, operations are more efficient for both parties and plans for new product development
and sales expansion strategies in the case of the receiving partner are better. At the topmost level
the information shared is strategic and competitive. Here, the partner possessing the information
can gain minimal benefit from the information if it is not shared. However the other party can
gain strategic and competitive benefits. This can occur for instance when the supplier has access
to the buyer’s POS information on sale of products from other suppliers in addition to
information on their own product sales.
The arguments posited by Seidmann and Sundararajan (1998) provide some useful
insights on understanding how the scope of information shared can benefit the buyer/supplier
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relationship, but by taking an ex post stance how these benefits are achieved is unclear. For
instance can one attribute the benefits to the type of information shared or the frequency with
which information is shared or some other factor? Although decisions surrounding the type of
IIS is outside the scope of their classification, its importance in supply networks warrants further
study and will be addressed in this dissertation.
Another scale-based study considers three different types of IIS (Gavirneni et al. 1999):
no information sharing, partial information sharing and full information sharing. With no
information sharing the supplier only has information on the orders received from the buyer and
must utilize historical data to augment the order information when preparing demand forecasts.
In the case of partial information sharing the demand distribution faced by the retailer and the
retailer’s inventory policy are known. Finally with full information sharing, the supplier also
receives instantaneous information on the retailer’s demand. This real-time sharing of
information essentially is concerned with the frequency with which information is shared, thus
can provide answers on questions dealing with “how to share”.
In another study Spekman et al. (1998) analyze the level of intensity in buyer-supplier
relationships. Intensity is characterized by the strategic importance and the complexity of the
relationship (financial, commercial) between the parties. The sharing relationship evolves from
one of cooperation (low strategic importance, high level complexity) to one where there is full
collaboration (high strategic importance, high complexity). When both the strategic importance
and complexity are low, no information is shared resulting in an arms-length relationship in
which there are open-market negotiations. At the cooperation level only essential pieces of
information are exchanged and there is the tendency for longer term contracts to be established.
The co-ordination phase (high strategic importance, low complexity) involves the exchange of

- 28 -

workflow and information. This facilitates the smooth flow of operations between the partners
thus allowing provisions for Just-in-time and EDI systems. As trust and commitment deepen, the
intensity level of the relationship increases further, to the point where collaboration occurs. At
this level, the information shared incorporates strategic plans, future designs and R&D.
Although this is an evolutionary process, Spekman et al (1998) argue that it is
unnecessary for all relationships to strive for collaboration since the relationship may not require
that high level of intensity to accomplish the common goals of the partners. Their study answers
questions on “what information is shared” by looking at the intensity of information shared,
however questions still remain on how to share.
The above review on information sharing perspectives though not exhaustive is
representative of much of the existing literature where we find a lack of consideration of both the
type of information shared and the frequency with which it is shared, factors that this study
intends to address.

2.3.3

Influence of Uncertainty on Information Sharing
Several research studies have investigated how conditions of uncertainty influence

information sharing between firms. These are examined in the context of horizontal relationships
as exist between oligopolies (Gal-Or 1985; Li 1985; Shapiro 1986; Spulber 1995; Ziv 1993) or
vertical relationships between a manufacturer and one or more retailers (Anand et al. 1997;
Cachon et al. 2000; Corbett 2001; Gal-Or 1991).
Uncertainty conditions typically examined are demand (Anand et al. 1997; Cachon et al.
2000; Clarke 1983; Gal-Or 1985; Li 1985), and supply in terms of costs (Clarke 1983; Corbett
2001; Li 1985; Shapiro 1986; Spulber 1995; Ziv 1993), and less frequently capacity (Farmer
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1994). Gal-Or’s (1985) study models the incentives for firms to share information when demand
is uncertain. The results indicate that private information will not be revealed in situations of
demand uncertainty where oligopolistic firms behave as Nash competitors when setting output
levels. This occurs regardless of the firm’s ability to make inferences about the signals that are
observed by others. Gal-Or’s derivation is based on a symmetric environment so may not be
generalizable to situations where there is a dominant firm. Also she considers only demand
uncertainty so the incentives for firms to share information may be different when technology or
supply is the uncertain parameter. Furthermore no interaction is considered between vertical
parties.
Both cost and demand uncertainty are investigated in Li’s (1985) study that examines
within a theoretical framework the incentives for multiple firms engaged in Cournot oligopoly to
share information when these uncertainties exist. While both Gal-Or (1985) and Clarke (1983)
assume that the signals are normally distributed, Li on the hand assumes that the signals are
linear and that the signals are received with equal precision thus are symmetric. Interestingly
there is a difference in the results between a firm’s willingness to reveal information that has
common value (demand in this case), and information that has private value (cost information in
this study). When firms face uncertainty in demand that is common to all firms, no information is
shared between firms however, when the private cost function is uncertain, firms are willing to
share information. As the total amount of information increases (measured by the increase in
total number of firms) firms are indifferent between pooling and non-pooling of information. His
results, for information sharing when there is demand uncertainty, are consistent with that found
by Clarke and also by Gal-Or in the case of a duopoly.
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In a later study Li (2002) extends the concept of information sharing when there is
uncertainty to examine what happens when information is shared vertically in a supply chain and
there is horizontal competition among the retailers. This is one of the few studies that look at
both vertical information sharing and horizontal competition. The model assumes that there is a
three stage non-cooperative game as follows: 1) retailer decides whether to share private
information about uncertainty with manufacturers who then decide whether to get this
information, 2) price for the goods are set by the manufacturer, 3) retailers send in orders and the
manufacturer produces to meet these orders. The common parameters, demand and private cost
uncertainty situations are examined. Results indicate that retailers have no incentive to
voluntarily share their demand information. One reason is that the competitors on learning of this
information (leakage effect) will make adjustments to their strategy. At the same time they are
unwilling to share any information with the manufacturer (direct effect) because such
information will be used to get more economic and information rent, which will hurt the retailer.
When information on costs is shared, the benefits to all retailers from sharing with the
manufacturer are greater than the unwanted direct effects thus retailers will share cost
information. The overall profit to the supply chain will increase with information sharing only if
there are a large enough number of retailers (greater than 2 retailers) or when each retailer’s
information is considered relatively informative, statistically. If all retailers share their demand
information with the manufacturer, consumers are worse off as manufacturers have to pay a price
to get this information since retailers are not willing to share this voluntarily. However they are
better off when cost information is shared or when there are no side payments for the
information.
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In this dissertation, how the relationship between IIS and performance is impacted when
there is internal uncertainty (i.e. the type of uncertainty that plays a critical role in the TCE
literature) is investigated. This is discussed in Section 2.5.

2.3.4

Information Distortion
Researchers have studied the information distortion resulting from delays, oscillations

and amplifications as demand information flows through the supply chain. This began with work
by Forrester (1958) and more recently by researchers such as Lee et al (1997b). This distortion is
characterized as the bullwhip effect, and looks at the variance between orders to the suppliers
and sales to the buyer. Sources identified for this effect are demand signal processing, rationing
game, order batching and price variations. In Lee et al’s (1997b) paper the researchers assume
that the decision makers are rational and propose that corrections to the bullwhip effect should
involve adjustments to organizational and institutional infrastructure and their processes. They
suggest that members in the supply network share information on sell-through and inventory
status data, coordinate orders across retailers and simplify the pricing and promotional activities
of manufacturer. Some suggestions on information sharing strategies that can contribute to the
significant reduction of the “bullwhip effect” are provided but these researchers (Lee et al.
1997b) do not provide much detail on how these strategies can impact the performance of the
supply network.

2.3.5

Performance Implications of Information Sharing
The impact of information sharing on performance has been investigated in several

research studies, however as mentioned in Section 1.1 the results have been ambiguous. Some
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researchers claim that information sharing significantly benefits the overall performance of the
supply network (Gavirneni et al. 1999; Lee et al. 2000a; Novshek et al. 1982)
while others point to minimal improvements (Aviv 2002; Cachon et al. 2000; Chen 1998) or to
no impact (Clarke 1983; Graves 1999).
Gavirneni et al (1999) investigate the value of information sharing when the parameters
of the retailer’s ordering policy are shared with the supplier who is the only source of inventory
and has limited capacity. They analyze three cases: 1) supplier has no information except prior
orders from retailer, 2) supplier knows demand distribution faced by retailer and the inventory
policy, 3) supplier also receives frequent updates on retailer’s demand. Savings when case 1 and
case 2 are compared ranged from 10% to 90% in situations where the additional information
relates to capacity. No benefit is found at low capacities when case 2 and case 3 are compared,
since in those situations there is very little opportunity for flexible production. At higher
capacities, savings range from 1% to 35%. Their study only looks at cases where the demand
processes are independent and identically distributed over time which is not necessarily true in
the real world and is only modeled based on a dyadic relationship.
Cachon et al (2000) compare the value of information sharing to that of reduced lead
times and reduced batch sizes in a model with one supplier and multiple retailers where demand
for each retailer is assumed to be independent. Since each retailer has an exclusive territory there
is no competition among the retailers. Their results show that the greatest reductions in costs
(proxy for value of shared information, thus supply performance improvements) are from
reduced batch size (22%) and reduced lead times (21%), with information sharing contributing
only 2.2% on average to reduced costs although it can be as high as 12.1%. The researchers
recommend that Information Technology implementation be focused on improving the physical
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flow of goods rather than the information flow through the supply chain. Only the direct effects
of vertical information are considered. Also not covered are the effects of information sharing
when retailers are not identical, or how firms behave when they do not have the same objectives?
Investigation on which parties stand to gain from information sharing indicate that the
manufacturer gains through inventory and cost reduction (Lee et al. 2000a). While the
manufacturer gets direct benefit from information sharing, this is not the case for the retailers
since their gains from cost savings and inventory reduction are derived from reduction in lead
times. Implementation of lead-time reduction and information sharing strategies concurrently are
recommended for a win-win situation.
Raghunathan (2001) refutes the claim made by Lee, So, and Tang (2000a) that there are
significant benefits to the manufacturer when the retailer shares information on Point-of-Sale
(POS) demand, claiming instead that the benefits of information sharing are overstated by Lee et
al. They assume that the manufacturer uses the retailer’s order history to forecast order for the
next period. Results indicate that information sharing has value to the manufacturer, only in the
situations where the demand parameters are unavailable and cannot be deduced from the
parameters that are available.
Another perspective is obtained from Yu et al’s (2001) study. They develop a costminimizing mathematical model involving a two stage decentralized supply chain with one
retailer and one manufacturer to show the benefits of information sharing in a supply chain.
Three levels of information sharing are studied: 1) no information shared except orders, 2)
demand information shared, 3) EDI used to access demand information and may use a Vendor
Managed Inventory system. Results show that while both the retailer and the manufacturer
receive benefits, the manufacturer stands to gain more as the level of information sharing
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increases, owing to a reduction in demand uncertainty. Benefit accrues only to the manufacturer
with level 2 information sharing, but at level 3 there is less variability in inventory levels and
overall inventory costs are minimized which benefits the retailer. The performance of the supply
chain shows an overall improvement with information sharing. Only one retailer is studied which
limits the practical application of this study.
Similar to Yu et al’s study, several research studies examine different levels of
information sharing. These are generally classified in terms of none, partial and full information
sharing (Anand et al. 1997; Aviv 2002; Chen 1999; Gavirneni et al. 1999; Li 1985; Zhao et al.
2002a) along a continuum. With no information sharing the only communication on demand for
instance is through order requisition, while with full information sharing, parties have access to
all the information that is needed for their decision making endeavors.

2.3.6

Role of Coordination Structure
As shown in Yu et al’s study, the coordination structure can facilitate better sharing of

information between the supply chain partners and is thus a critical element with respect to
information strategies. Coordination structures range from decentralized where decisions are
made independently, to fully centralized structures where decisions are made by a single entity
(Anand et al. 1997; Chen et al. 2000; Corbett 2001; Yu et al. 2001). Information sharing and
physical flow coordination are identified as critical prerequisites for supply chain integration
(Sahin et al. 2002). Based on an extensive review of the literature on physical flow coordination
and information sharing in a supply network, Sahin & Robinson (2002) classify this literature
stream into three categories: no information sharing and no physical flows coordination, partial
and full information sharing with no physical flow coordination, and full information sharing and
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full system coordination. They suggest that a richer understanding of supply chain integration
can be obtained if the problem scope studied is broadened to include environments, structures
and processes that are more representative of the industrial context than the simple analytical
models typically used to explore many of these phenomena. Towards this end, empirical studies
provide one avenue for accomplishing this goal, assuming that the proper metrics are used to
operationalize the variables being studied.
In summary, the various research streams on IIS allude to the complexities associated
with this phenomenon and the importance of having a clear understanding of the underlying
forces that are involved. Theoretical and empirical evidence from these studies highlight the
importance of structures, processes and the resulting outcome measures, within environments
that are subject to uncertain conditions. Prior studies have investigated this partially with respect
to IIS but a synthesized view that assimilates these linkages has not been established. In this
study, a move towards filling this void in the literature is made by examining, within the context
of the supply network, how the supply network configuration (a structural factor) influences IIS
and in turn how this impacts the performance of the supply network in the face of certain internal
uncertainty conditions.

2.4

Factors Influencing IIS
In the economics literature there is an extensive body of work that uses mathematical

models to study equilibrium conditions under which information sharing occurs in competitive
markets. Typical parameters that have been analyzed for their influence are the characteristics of
the product, the type of uncertainty, and the type of information shared (public, private, cost,
demand). The ensuing analysis of IIS within a supply network is guided by some of these
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findings in addition to studies in other fields such as strategic management, sociology,
marketing, and operations research.

2.4.1

Supply Network Configuration
Traditionally the supply network configuration is viewed as one that is primarily

concerned with the collaboration between firms on facility selection and allocation of products to
selected sites. However a broader perspective envisions it as a “dynamic process of assembling
chains of capabilities and not just collaborating organizations” (Herer et al. 2002).
The strategic importance of networks has led to the expansion of the supply chain
concept to incorporate supply networks (Lamming et al. 2000). A supply network can be defined
as:
“[a network] nested within wider inter-organization[al] networks and consists of
interconnected entities whose primary purpose is the procurement, use and transformation of
resources to provide packages of goods and services.” (Harland et al., 2001)
or as
“a complex adaptive system: it is emerging, self-organizing, dynamic, and evolving”
where “a complex adaptive supply network is a collection of firms that seek to maximize their
individual profit and livelihood by exchanging information, products, and services with one
another.” (Choi et al. 2001)
Both definitions indicate the complex nature of these supply networks; however, the
latter definition goes a step further by introducing the concept of a flexible system that changes
in response to the needs of the business, and one in which firms take a more active role in
facilitating the change process. The supply network can have multiple stages and in each stage it
is possible to reduce duplication of effort and unnecessary activities by focusing on congruent
objectives. Thus the potential for success is enhanced when critical information is shared
between supply network partners (Spekman et al. 1998).

- 37 -

The supply network configuration can range from simple inter-organizational sets to
more complex network arrangements involving many stages. The structural dimensions
frequently used in the literature to describe complex supply networks are: vertical structure,
horizontal structure, and location in the network (Harland 1996; Lambert et al. 1998; Randall et
al. 2001; Spens et al. 2002). Applying these dimensions to a wider organizational set that
includes both single and multi-stage arrangements, the network pattern and location in the
network are examined.
Both the structure of a firm’s network, and where each firm and its contacts are located in
the structure determine the likelihood of a firm gaining benefit from the network (Burt 1992).
Thus a study of these factors and the ensuing interactions between network partners provides
some useful insights that can contribute towards a better understanding of IIS and the overall
behavior of transacting parties. Within the supply network, goods and services flow in one
direction; payments flow in the opposite direction; and information flows in both directions.
Network Pattern
Three different network patterns can be used to study inter-organizational relationships:
dyadic, multiple dyadic and multi-channel networks (Van de Ven et al. 1980). The patterns for a
single stage relationship between two layers of the network are depicted as follows:
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Wholesaler

Supplier

Dyadic

Wholesaler

Supplier

Wholesaler

Wholesaler

Supplier

Wholesaler

Wholesaler

Supplier

Wholesaler

Multiple Dyadic

Figure 1. Network Patterns – Single Stage
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Many-to-many Network

a) Dyadic network refers to the interaction between two firms (e.g. 1 supplier and 1
wholesaler).
b) Multiple dyadic network refers to the interaction of one firm with several other firms (1 to N
or N to 1). This can take the form of 1 supplier and N-wholesalers or N-suppliers and 1
wholesaler, for example. Here the N-participants can also be competitors. An example of the
1 to N interaction is the relationship between an airline and several independent travel
agencies.
c) Multi-channel network denotes relationships in which several firms interact with several
other firms (M to N or many to many). Possible interactions include M-suppliers linked to Nwholesalers with competition possible within the M and the N – groups.
The number of suppliers contributes to the complexity of the supply network (Beamon 1999).
Complexity is reflected in the load on the network for coordination purposes, and this is based on
the degree of differentiation among the firms in the SN and the level of coupling (Choi et al.
2002). Ceteris paribus, the least complexity will be experienced in the dyadic network and the
most in the multi-channel network.
Number of stages
In addition to the single-stage it is also possible to have multi-stage relationships. In its
simplest form, denoted as the multi-stage dyadic network, a single firm is connected to one other
firm at the next stage in a chain that extends from the initial raw material supplier to the end
consumer. In this arrangement relationships exist primarily between firms that are adjacent to
each other along the chain although exceptions may occur during initial startup when
relationships may involve interactions between firms from noncontiguous stages.
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A more complex pattern exists for the multi-stage network as shown in figure 2:
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Figure 2. Network Pattern – Multi-stage Network (Source: Adapted from Lambert & Cooper, 2000)

In this pattern there is both a vertical and a horizontal dimension. The horizontal
dimension depicts the number of firms at each stage. For instance in the supply network for the
Accord center console there are two suppliers (CVT and JFC) who have a direct relationship
with Honda and each of these suppliers have several second suppliers with whom they in turn
have direct relationships (Choi et al. 2002). The vertical dimension depicts the number of stages
extending from the initial raw material, located furthest upstream from the focal firm, to the
consumer/end customer located furthest downstream from the focal firm. The level of integration
between the focal firm and upstream (suppliers) and downstream (customers/buyers) entities will
vary depending on their perceived importance to the focal firm (Lambert et al. 2000).
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Location of the firm in the Supply network
The third factor in the supply network configuration is the location of a firm in the
network. Here the focus is on the sub-network comprised of one buyer and one supplier. Each
participant has a location in the supply network that can range from a location at the initial
source of raw materials to one at the consumer, or somewhere in between (Lambert et al. 2000).
A firm’s location in the supply network can affect its experiences and consequently its
interactions with others in the network.
For instance, the pace of technological change, “clockspeed”, differs dramatically in
industries and is also uneven across the supply network (Fine 1998). He notes that the
entertainment industry has one of the fastest “clockspeeds”, with the half-life of motion pictures
ascertained just days after launch. On the other hand the automobile industry has a much slower
“clockspeed” of four to eight years before retooling of a model. According to Fine, firms further
downstream, that is, closer to the consumer experience greater “clockspeed” amplification. In
markets with fast “clockspeeds”, low barriers to entry and low switching costs can dramatically
reduce first mover competitive advantage as competitors quickly produce close substitutes.
Demand volatility also differs depending on a firm’s location in the network. This
volatility arises from the failure to accurately forecast future requirements causing production
schedules to be inefficient. According to Lee et al (1997a) the further upstream a firm is in the
supply network (away from the consumer), the greater the demand volatility and this is attributed
to an amplification of the distortion of information. For instance, in a network with a retailer,
manufacturer of finished goods, and parts supplier, the retailer will have the least demand
volatility and the parts supplier will have the most. Such volatility can be reduced if members in
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the supply chain provide upstream members with access to sell through data, and information on
the status of inventory (Lee et al. 1997b).

2.4.2

Coordination Structure
One of the challenges for organizations is how to accomplish “purposeful, coordinated

action from organizations comprising many individuals” (Grant 1996). The coordination
structure plays an integral role and is particularly important in the sharing of information across
firm boundaries. Coordination structure has been defined as “a pattern of decision-making and
communication among a set of actors who perform tasks in order to achieve goals” (Malone
1987). Two of the key determinants of a firm’s coordination structure are decision rights and
information structure (Anand et al. 1997).
Decision Rights
Decision rights determine where the locus of authority resides for making decisions, that
is, ‘who’ makes the decision. Two extremes on this continuum are centralization and
decentralization. In a highly centralized structure the locus of authority resides at a single point,
while in a highly decentralized structure the locus of authority is dispersed (Robbins 1990). For
example, the degree of centralization in a supply network context can be determined by the
amount of authority that the final assembler has over the suppliers in the network (Choi et al.
2002). When the locus of authority for making decisions resides with the final assembler, the
supply network is centralized. In the decentralized structure each supplier can independently
make its own decisions. As the supply network evolves and becomes more complex, centralized
decision-making can become arduous, as a single point of contact is unable to effectively handle
all decision-making activities.
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Information structure
The second determinant of coordination structure is information structure and is
concerned with identifying the type of information that is available for decision-making
purposes. Decisions within a SN can be based on local information, global information or a
hybrid of the two (Anand et al. 1997). A SN with centralized authority is associated with the use
of global information, while a decentralized one will rely on local information for decisionmaking, even though mismatches can occur as studied by Anand and Mendelson (1997). These
combinations of decision and information structure can be thought of as ‘centralized
coordination structure’ and ‘decentralized coordination structure’ respectively (Samaddar et al.
2006).
Several researchers suggest centralization as the primary structural mechanism to achieve
the integration needed to coordinate complex systems (John et al. 1984; Russell et al. 1992; Tsai
2002). According to Robbins (1990) the decision on the appropriate level of centralization will
depend on situational factors. In a decentralized coordination structure firms are able to respond
quickly to changes at their individual location, which is an important capability to have when the
local environment is susceptible to rapid changes. Such a structure offers opportunities for the
decision maker to incorporate the local information when making decisions. A decentralized
structure is also more appropriate when there are characteristics that are unique to a particular
location or firm, such as local nuances, which need to be considered before making a decision.
As such, it cannot be easily captured in a centralized system owing to the specific (or tacit)
nature of its knowledge. For instance, in some liquor stores sales data on each store is collected
and that information is used to analyze store performance, and forecast reorder amounts
cognizant of local drinking habits and tastes. One of the drawbacks of a decentralized structure is
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the likelihood for misalignment between the interests of an individual firm and those of the
network. Thus the costs incurred in inducing the firm to adjust its interest to match those of the
network can be high (Anand et al. 1997).
In contrast, the centralized coordination structure is more appropriate when the decision
maker needs to take actions that benefit the total network, rather than the special interests of
individual firms. This structure is also more suitable when there are distinct economies of scale,
or a need for using standard products and procedures. For example, a large department store,
used POS data from all of their stores for centralized demand trend analysis and to make
purchasing decisions (Anand et al. 1997).
The centralized coordinated structure also has its challenges. It is costly to gather
information that is tailored to meet the needs of individual firms. Such information is however
necessary to get optimal performance in the supply network. For instance a supplier may receive
POS data from retailers but also needs to be told about a promotion that a retailer is planning to
mount in the near future, so that the correct replenishment decision can be made (Aviv 2002).
Another challenge with a centralized structure is that entities that are under the control of the
central authority tend to display more loyalty to the authorized body, which makes it difficult to
get cooperation between firms in the network on issues such as those related to quality and
delivery (Choi et al. 2002).

2.5

The Role of Uncertainty in Supply Networks
Several problems associated with supply networks have been attributed to uncertainty

surrounding the network. Uncertainty can be defined as the difference between the information
needed to perform a task and the information currently available to an organization (Galbraith
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1973). Unpredictable situations and behaviors are likely to result from the many alternative
outcomes that are possible. For example, problems such as the “bull whip effect" (Lee et al.
1997a), and expedited orders to meet unplanned demand create suboptimal results for the supply
network. A key organizational challenge for managers is how to manage a variety of
interdependencies in the face of behavioral uncertainty (McEvily et al. 2003) from this lack or
absence of critical information.
Uncertainty has been characterized in several different ways but they can all be
considered as arising from sources that are either internal or external to a particular domain. The
three main sources (Fig. 3) present in supply networks are:
1) suppliers (e.g. delayed deliveries),
2) manufacturing (e.g. machine breakdowns),
3) customers (e.g. fluctuation in orders)
Ultimately, all of these sources have an adverse effect on customer service and the overall
performance of the network (Davis 1993; Yu et al. 2001).

Figure 3. Sources of Supply Network Uncertainty (Adapted from Davis, 1993)
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Of key importance to this study of supply networks are two distinct internal uncertainties:
partner uncertainty (primary source: supplier) and process uncertainty (primary source:
manufacturing).

2.5.1

Partner Uncertainty
Two conditions that impact the level of partner uncertainty are partner information

visibility and variability in supplier capability.
Partner information visibility refers to the extent to which the information provided by a
firm within a network to its partners is adequate to assess the present conditions of that firm’s
(the provider of information) operations. Critical to that assessment is having information that is
accurate, timely, complete and comprehensible. When any of those information attributes fall
short of the level required to properly assess the partnering firm’s operations, the level of partner
information visibility is reduced.
Firms react to low partner information visibility by distorting, delaying, providing partial
information or obfuscating the information provided. For instance, two of the strategies that
firms use when there is low partner information visibility are demand signal processing and
shortage gaming (Lee et al. 1997b). In shortage gaming, firms place multiple orders with several
suppliers in order to have a higher probability of receiving sufficient quantities of a product that
is in short supply. Such actions are oftentimes driven by a lack of adequate operational
information from suppliers on matters such as their inventory levels. With demand signal
processing, firms artificially raise the size of orders to their suppliers in periods of rising demand
as they anticipate that it will continue to increase. Inflated and phantom orders cause the
suppliers to overproduce. Long lead times exacerbate this situation as it is virtually impossible to
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quickly halt production when the expected demand does not materialize and there are an
unusually high number of order cancellations. It is quite likely that the orders would not have
been distorted had buyers had access to Just in time (JIT) purchasing or been privy to current
information on the production schedules, inventory levels and lead times of their suppliers all of
which require the sharing of information.
Low partner information visibility also has a negative impact on the party that withholds
information. Buyers, for example, that fail to provide timely information on their volume
requirements miss out on the potential for economies of scale that could have been realized had
the supplier been able to incorporate that information into his/her plans. Consequently it becomes
more costly for those buyers to acquire their products. Overall there are losses for the supply
network since adequate IIS is needed to devise plans that can provide optimal performance for
the supply network (Sadler et al. 2002).
Variability in supplier capability is defined as the level of uncertainty that exists when a
firm is unable to determine if a supplier has the capability to function effectively under
circumstances that differ from those that existed when the agreement (formal or informal) was
originally established. As firms have become more focused on their core competencies, there has
been a greater reliance on external parties to fulfill their other requirements (Handfield et al.
2002). Driving force for doing this is to gain competitive advantage through reduced costs and
time to market, improved quality, and access to the technological capabilities of their partners
(Handfield et al. 1999b). Since firms rely heavily on their partners to provide the resources that
are needed to augment their core functions, the ability of these partners to meet their expectations
is of paramount importance.
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Uncertainties arise when there is high variability in a supplier’s capabilities. Such
uncertainties exist despite high partner information visibility as the latter is more focused on the
present situation. Even with information that allows an assessment of a firm’s operations,
questions still remain on whether or not that firm can perform as expected when for instance a
product requires significant design changes. Apart from the uncertainty that arises when there are
significant product/component changes, variability in supplier capability can also occur when
there are significant process or technology interface changes. All these changes can adversely
impact the scope or scale of operations of a supplier, which in turn affects the quality and
timeliness of the goods and services provided. The ability of a supplier to meet quality and
timeliness standards appears to be of some concern to buyers evidenced by the prime importance
placed on these two criteria during the supplier evaluation process (Chao et al. 1993).
When suppliers have inadequate capability they tend to show deficiencies in matters such
as quality, delivery, product design capability, and the ability to reduce costs and adopt new
technology (Monczka et al. 1991). Some of these deficiencies may be attributable to personnel
not being trained to keep abreast of new technologies, obsolete or inefficient equipment, and
inadequate plant capacity.
Supplier development programs such as those instituted when the manufacturer is able to
identify that their suppliers are unable to meet previously established business objectives
(Handfield et al. 2000) can be used to improve a supplier’s capabilities. Supplier development
activities can take several forms including supplier certification programs, supplier training,
formal evaluations and site visits (Krause et al. 1997; Monczka et al. 1993). The timely
execution of these activities is critical to the overall performance of the supply network. A few
firms such as Honda and Toyota have achieved faster improvements in the capability of their
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suppliers through direct supplier development involving the provision of capital, technology,
personnel and equipment resources to their suppliers (Monczka et al. 1993).

2.5.2

Process Uncertainty
Process uncertainty is defined as “fluctuations in process outcomes and production times

due to variable process yields, perishable end-products, machine breakdowns, etc” (Vorst et al.
1998). All of these fluctuations provide some indication of the capacity of an organization to
meet their scheduled production commitments (Geary et al. 2002). Process uncertainty within the
manufacturing cycle has been categorized (Koh et al. 2002) into three parts as follows:
•

Internal supply uncertainty which takes place at the supply chain and leads to lotsizing and planning horizon uncertainty as well as capacity loading uncertainty (e.g.
late arrival of parts from one work station).

•

Internal demand uncertainty that occurs at the demand chain and leads to process
yield loss or variation in quality (e.g. inconsistencies in the quality of the
manufacturing process).

•

Internal demand and supply uncertainty that leads to variation in process lead times
and scrap, and affects the availability of parts.

One way of dealing with these uncertainties is to institute inventory (e.g. safety stock),
capacity (e.g. excess capacity) and time (e.g. lead time) buffers in the production system (Hopp
et al. 2004). It is important that managers understand the operational requirements and resource
capabilities of their particular organization, and how they impact other firms in the network so
that the correct mechanisms can be instituted to reduce costs and increase efficiency. Several
costs are incurred when there is a machine breakdown, for example. These costs include those
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for inspection, repair, and machine downtime which are measured as lower product quality or
lost production capacity (Mann et al. 1995).
Although some researchers (Davis 1993) suggest that demand uncertainty from external
sources has the greatest impact on the performance of the supply network, the influence of
process uncertainty cannot be ignored. Process uncertainty can affect other activities of the
supply network as shown in Figure 4 where the process uncertainty loop (one of the three
feedback loops) contributes to the overall instability and chaos (Childerhouse et al. 2003).
Uncertain deliveries result from this process uncertainty which in turn adversely affects the
supply network, creating distortions in customer orders and further distortions to information
flow. This continues in a “vicious circle” (Childerhouse et al. 2003) and is exacerbated by other
uncertainties present in the network.

Figure 4. The “Vicious Circle” Caused from Uncertainty (Adopted from Childerhouse et al, 2003)
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Ultimately the operational performance of the supply network may be adversely affected
so it is important that the design of processes incorporate the relevant policies and procedures,
and that IIS occurs in a timely manner.
According to Geary et al (2002) uncertainty in the supply network can be alleviated and
performance improved if companies try to develop a “seamless supply chain”, which they define
as:
“an idealized concept of perfect information flow and perfect material flow, facilitated by
all supply chain players thinking and acting as one. Yet although it is an idealized concept, the
seamless supply chain is not beyond reach in reality. In fact there is a well-trodden path in that
direction that relies on best practices and extended visibility. Supply chain leaders who follow
this path will be rewarded with improved business performance.”

Best practices advocated include lean thinking, value stream management, and smooth material
flow while at the same time maintaining simplicity through the use of established and proven
solutions.
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3.

RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

Building on the theoretical foundations presented in the prior chapter, a framework for
this dissertation is now developed that addresses the research questions related to IIS in the
supply network. The expected relationships between different types of IIS and various
configurations of the supply network are postulated. The impact of the degree of
centralization on these relationships is also explored. The argument proposed is that the
type of IIS will vary depending on these factors and that the impact of IIS on the
performance of the network will be influenced by partner and process uncertainty
considerations. The research model is presented in Figure 5.
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Figure 5. Research Model
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In order to study IIS from a broader perspective than is customary in the literature, we use a twodimensional matrix that looks at both the type of information shared (operational vs. strategic)
and the frequency of information sharing (low vs. high) (Samaddar et al. 2004) which is
presented in Table 3-1.
Table 3-1.

Typology of Inter-organizational sharing

Frequency of
IIS

Type of Information
Operational

Strategic

Low

Type 1

Type 3

High

Type 2

Type 4

Since the focus is on information sharing transactional types of arrangements between partners,
which typically involve arms-length relationship in which no information is shared, are excluded.
Type 1 (Type 2) IIS is the low (high) frequency state where only operational information is
shared. Similarly, Type 3 (Type 4) is the low (high) frequency state where strategic information
is shared. Characteristics associated with each of these types are discussed in Appendix A.

3.1

Supply Network Configuration and IIS
In Section 2.4.1 three key dimensions of supply network configuration were identified:

network pattern, number of stages, and location in the network. The contention is that the level
and type of IIS will vary depending on these factors.

3.1.1

Network Pattern and IIS
Let us first discuss IIS with respect to the dyadic network pattern. A firm investing in

highly specified assets is susceptible to opportunistic behavior from an exchange partner unless
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protective safeguards are put in place to prevent such behavior from occurring (Williamson
1985). Vertical integration is suggested as the traditional safeguard when asset specificity is
substantial and uncertainty is high, as here transaction costs will be minimized (Williamson
1991).
Since the survival of the relationship depends on both parties there is a high level of
interdependence. For instance, consider the case where a manufacturer makes high investments
in employee training that has applicability only for the products that it makes for a specific buyer
and for which no other sources are readily available to provide such products. Given this
information specificity (Choudhury et al. 1997) and the lack of alternative sources, both buyer
and supplier are interdependent and recognize that mutual cooperation is necessary in order for
the venture to succeed. The desire to survive will motivate transacting parties to behave,
according to TCE, as if they were one firm (Williamson 1991) showing high levels of
cooperation and this will result in lower monitoring costs (Dyer et al. 1998; Nelson 1998; Ouchi
1980).
A similar sentiment is expressed in social network theory where interdependence is
associated with direct connections. Characteristics of these direct connections are strong ties
between parties, and a high degree of closeness and reciprocity (Granovetter 1973;
Haythornwaite 1996; Marsden et al. 1984). As parties develop satisfaction with their exchange
processes there will be increased commitment to an ongoing relationship (Dwyer et al. 1987b).
In such an environment, there is high relational embeddedness where the sharing of “finegrained” or strategic information is encouraged (Granovetter 1973; Marsden et al. 1984; Uzzi
1996; Uzzi 1999). Since fine-grained information refers to more detailed information, more
frequent information sharing can be expected.
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Turning from a dyadic to the single stage one-to-many network structure (multiple dyadic
interaction pattern), TCE suggests that as the number of members in the network increases, the
chance for costly hold-ups is reduced due to the availability of alternative sources (Williamson
1975; Williamson 1985). Thus parties who are desirous of remaining in the network will not
behave opportunistically since they can be easily replaced. However there will be high
transaction costs associated with coordinating the activities of an expanded network.
One challenge faced with this type of structure is the potential for competition between
network members who are structurally equivalent, “those with a similar pattern of relations in a
system” (Gulati 1995), but are not connected directly. Structurally equivalent firms will be
reluctant to share private information with a transacting party due to the fear of information
leakage (Li 2002; Seidmann et al. 1998). Absent highly specified assets, such fears will outweigh
the closeness associated with high relational embeddedness (or strong ties). Thus exchange
parties will be connected, as suggested in social network theory, with weak ties characterized by
arms length transactions where only operational information is shared (Granovetter 1973; Uzzi
1996).
For instance, a study of several apparel firms found that manufacturers would share
information on the designs that were in high demand only with those buyers with whom they had
established strong ties (Uzzi 1996; Uzzi 1997). Further evidence on how tie strength affects the
type of information shared is given by the following situation. Contractors with whom an apparel
manufacturer maintained strong ties and frequent interaction learnt of the closing down of
production operations nine months ahead of time, yet that information was not shared with
contractors with whom manufacturers had weak ties (Uzzi 1997). Weaker ties are also generally
associated with less frequent interactions and a focus on achieving only operational efficiency. A
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transaction that involves weak ties has been referred to as “a deal in which costs are everything”
or a “one shot deal” (Uzzi 1997) which suggests that with weak ties no strategic information will
be shared and that the frequency of interaction will be very low.
Hypothesis 1a: The single-stage dyadic pattern in a SN is associated with Type 4 IIS (high
frequency, strategic).
Hypothesis 1b: The single-stage multiple dyadic pattern in a SN is associated with Type 1 IIS
(low frequency, operational).
3.1.2

Number of Stages and IIS
The multi-stage network relationships involve much more complexity and multiple

interactions across several stages in the supply network than for the single stage. In these
arrangements, it is difficult to identify the optimal state owing to the complex (“rugged”) and
dynamic nature of the network patterns (“landscape”), that send conflicting signals to the
members in the supply network (Choi et al. 2001).
With so many stages and suppliers, maintaining efficient operations becomes very
challenging owing to these different levels of interaction, varying informational needs, and
incompatible goals. Since not all firms in the network are interested in, or may require
maintaining close relationships (Lambert et al. 2000), both strong and weak ties will be in
existence (Larson 1992). In this environment it is expected that strong ties will form among
subgroups where strategic information will be shared but this information will not extend outside
these close groups to firms that do not have these direct links.
Many firms in subsequent stages are unable to ascertain the impact that their actions have
on others in the network so may act in their own self-interest thus increasing the transaction costs
associated with doing business. Strategic information will not permeate through this seemingly
decentralized network. Difficulties in coordinating activities are even more pronounced than for
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the single stage and will necessitate sharing information frequently in an attempt to manage the
interdependencies between parties.
Using external sources or systems to coordinate the flow through the supply network as
complexity increases can mitigate some of these difficulties. For instance, one can use banks to
coordinate payments, and inter-organizational systems such as the Sabre airline reservation
system to coordinate the flow of information among airlines, travel agencies, customers, rental
car companies and hotels (Premkumar 2000).
Hypothesis 2: As the number of stages in the SN increases, the frequency with which operational
information is shared also increases (Type 2 IIS).

3.1.3

Location in the Network and IIS
Firms located downstream are more likely to share competitive and strategic information

since the buyer, who is further downstream, has more relative bargaining power. This is due to
the greater possibility that substitutes will be available, thus providing a wider choice of sources
from which to procure the required goods (Seidmann et al. 1998). Consequently the potential for
costly holdups is greater at locations closer to the initial source of raw material for the buyer. In
these situations the buyer, who is in a vulnerable position, is unlikely to transfer decision rights
to the supplier and will only share information that is required to improve operational efficiency
(Seidmann et al. 1998).
Conversely, at locations closer to the consumer, both the buyer and the supplier have
profit maximizing goals that are closely aligned which will deter opportunistic behavior thus
lowering transaction costs (Williamson 1985; Williamson 1991). Exchange partners are willing
to share decision rights which entail the sharing of strategic information in order to achieve the
desired results.
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Firms located downstream have closer bonds to the consumer who ultimately drives the
demand in the supply network. These firms will therefore share information frequently as they
strive to respond to the diverse demands of their customer base. Conversely upstream firms are
much further away from the consumer and so have weaker ties to them. As such they are not as
attuned to the needs of any one consumer since their outputs may not be geared to any particular
market. Consequently they will share only operational information.
Hypothesis 3a: In the SN, the location of firms close to the consumer (downstream) is associated
with Type 4 IIS.
Hypothesis3b: In the SN, the location of firms close to the initial source of raw material
(upstream) is associated with Type 1 IIS.

3.2 The Moderating Role of the Coordination Structure
In this section arguments are developed to support the position that within a supply
network, the degree of centralization will influence the relationship between the various
configurations of the supply network and the associated types of IIS. Centralization facilitates the
establishment of a shared language and code (Nahapiet et al. 1998) making it easier for partners
to share information (strategic or operational).
For a single stage dyadic supply network, where there is a centralized coordination
structure, one party (buyer or seller) will exercise authority and power over the relationship
(Choi et al. 2002). The extent of that power is inversely related to the alternatives available to the
other party. Where there are few alternatives (reliance is high), the more dependent party will
voluntarily comply with the demands made by the other party and work towards accomplishing
the goals that are beneficial to the relationship (Lawler et al. 1993). Such is the case in many
buyer-supplier dyadic relationships where information specificity exists to a non-trivial degree.
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It is expected that strong ties are more likely to develop in a centralized structure owing
to the presence of a common language, and such a structure will allow exchange partners to
share strategic information more efficiently. For instance, in regards to the Acura product line,
Honda as final assembler, is in control of product design through use of a “guest engineer
program” in which some of its engineers are on the top-tier suppliers’ sites (Choi et al. 2002). An
advantage of this program is the interaction that is afforded from co-location of the engineers
from each firm, allowing the development of strong ties and, consistent with social network
theory arguments, the sharing of strategic information.
On the contrary, in the decentralized coordination structure where both parties in the
relationship behave autonomously there will be an absence of shared language and codes making
it more difficult to share strategic information efficiently.
Hypothesis 4a: For a single-stage dyadic SN the association with strategic IIS is stronger with a
centralized coordination structure than with a decentralized coordination structure.
As the complexity increases from dyadic to multiple dyadic up to multi-channel and
multi-stage networks, a centralized coordination structure serves as a bridge across structural
holes in the network. Such a structure has accessibility to network members even several stages
down from the locus of control (Burt 1992). The frequency with which operational information
is shared will increase given that there is a focal decision-maker that now has direct access to
many members. In this central position the party can more effectively formulate plans that take
the whole network into consideration. Although some firms in the network may resent the
control by a central authority, the threat of being dropped from the network are sufficient to
counteract any thoughts of resisting this type of control.
With a decentralized coordination structure, local suppliers have autonomy and so can
respond quickly to the needs of their immediate customers without having to wait for
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information to be processed through a central body (Bolton et al. 1990). Should they require
operational information from parties outside their immediate domain this can be done through
weak ties which can be established quickly. However parties involved in these exchanges will
normally act in their own self-interest without any consideration for the goals of their partners
(Nelson et al. 1991). Consequently it is unlikely that strategic information will be shared under
these circumstances or that the information shared will be done frequently. In situations where
there are multiple suppliers of the same product or product line, each firm will consider the other
firms as rivals and therefore be unwilling to share private information. It is therefore expected
that the relationships as posited in Propositions 1a, 1b will not be changed significantly with
decentralization.
Hypothesis 4b: For a single stage multiple dyadic SN the frequency with which firms share
operational information is higher with a centralized coordination structure than with a
decentralized coordination structure.

Hypothesis 4c: As the number of stages in a SN increases, the frequency with which operational
information is shared inter-organizationally is higher with a centralized coordination structure
than with a decentralized coordination structure.

3.3

IIS, Uncertainty and Performance
In a world of perfect certainty, full accessibility to information renders IIS unnecessary

for achieving optimal performance in the supply network. However, when there is some element
of uncertainty, which occurs in many situations, the value of IIS can appreciate.
There is wide acceptance that IIS can be a source of competitive advantage (Dyer et al.
1998). IIS reduces the level of uncertainty (Reed et al. 1990), lowers information asymmetries,
contracting and monitoring costs (Dyer 1997). As discussed in earlier chapters, benefits from IIS
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such as reduced inventory levels (Bourland et al. 1996; Cachon et al. 2000) lead to increased
efficiencies among members both downstream and upstream in the supply network.
Numerous research studies provide support for the positive relationship between IIS and
performance (Cachon et al. 2000; Chen 1998; Gavirneni et al. 1999; Lee et al. 2000a), but the
support in the literature is not unanimous. Part of the ambiguity found in the literature on the
linkages between IIS and performance can be attributed to the role of uncertainty and this will be
investigated. Changes in performance under uncertainty conditions can emanate from several
sources such as processes and suppliers (Bhatnagar et al. 2005; Davis 1993). Thus it is expected
that both partner uncertainty and process uncertainty will have an influence on the positive
relationship between IIS and performance. The focus is on the performance of the supply
network as this is more important than the performance of an individual firm (Lee et al. 1992).

3.3.1

The Role of Partner Uncertainty
Recall from Section 2.5 that partner uncertainty can arise from either low partner

information visibility or variability in supplier capability. The realization that a partner has
provided poor information may be difficult to detect at the time when information is shared. It
may only be recognized as such at a later stage when, attempts to make a true assessment of the
partner’s operations are hampered as a result of the inadequacy of the information.
When partner information visibility is low, the efficiency of the supply network is
reduced and the cost of doing business may be elevated. There is a greater likelihood that
suboptimal decisions will be made both at the operational (e.g. production scheduling) and
strategic level (marketing strategies or outsourcing alternatives) owing to the information
asymmetry. Low partner information visibility has a particularly detrimental effect on upstream
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firms that are not closely linked to the end consumer owing to the presence of demand
uncertainty (Lee et al. 1997b).
Development of alternative strategies can alleviate some of the uncertainty. This may
elevate transaction costs such as information, operating, and administrative costs which
ultimately leads to lower performance of the supply network. For instance more inventories may
be held to hedge against uncertainties but this leads to higher inventory costs thus reducing
performance. Firms that develop a more collaborative relationship with their suppliers, where
there are strong ties thus a better potential for a high degree of partner information visibility, can
gain improved performance not only for their individual firms but for the overall supply network.
Since low partner visibility has such detrimental consequences on the performance of the firm,
the value of information shared is greater under these circumstances than when partner
information visibility is high.
Hypothesis 5a: The performance of a SN with high partner information visibility will be higher
than the performance of a SN with low partner information visibility.
Hypothesis 5b: There is a stronger positive association between operational IIS and
performance of the supply network in a SN with high partner information visibility than in a SN
with low partner information visibility
Hypothesis 5c: There is a stronger positive association between strategic IIS and performance of
the supply network in a SN with high partner information visibility than in a SN with low partner
information visibility

Supplier capability is also of critical importance to firms. Many firms perform an
assessment of their suppliers’ capabilities as part of the selection process; however this does not
guarantee that those suppliers will be able to perform adequately when conditions change. Given
a firm’s uncertainty about the ability of a supplier to maintain agreed on standards, that firm will
be hesitant to formulate plans that entail large capital investments, particularly when they are
locked-in to their present arrangement. TCE suggests that high uncertainty surrounding a
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partner’s capability will lead to sub-optimal decisions and it is thus expected that the
performance of the supply network will be adversely affected.
When there is high uncertainty surrounding a supplier’s capability operational IIS will
have very little value as the information shared is primarily relevant for assessing the current
operations. Strategic IIS on the other hand has much greater value as that information can
provide insights on issues such as plant facility expansion, personnel training, and financing
alternatives for the supplier. One way to facilitate this type of IIS is through participation in
supplier development activities. Through a supplier development program, for instance, firms
will be more likely to communicate frequently, share proprietary information and are overall
more successful than their counterparts that show little involvement (Krause et al. 1997).
Hypothesis 6a: The performance of a SN with high variability in supplier capability will be
lower than the performance of a SN with low variability in supplier capability
Hypothesis 6b: There is a stronger positive association between strategic IIS and the
performance of the supply network in a SN with high variability in supplier capability than in a
SN with low variability in supplier capability.

3.3.2

The Role of Process Uncertainty
As suggested in Section 2.5, process uncertainty has implications for the operational

efficiency of the supply network. For instance, as process uncertainty increases, the waste
associated with that process also increases (Persson 1995). While vertical integration is
suggested as providing optimal efficiency when uncertainty is high (Williamson 1985) this may
not be possible owing to such factors as the unavailability of expertise or other resources in one
firm and the high procurement costs to make such a change. Thus firms may turn to traditional
measures such as safety buffers in order to deal with high process uncertainty. Increased
operational costs are incurred as firms hold excess inventory to offset uncertainty associated with
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deliveries and demand. Increased transaction costs may also be incurred as firms implement
more intensive monitoring and performance evaluation procedures to safeguard against network
member firms’ inefficiencies and to ensure that proper standards are met. Overall, the increased
costs arising from process uncertainty will reduce the performance of the supply network.
When process uncertainty is high, both operational and strategic IIS can provide value to
firms in the supply network. Operational IIS can allow firms to take proactive action by
modifying their own internal schedules thereby reducing the impact on the firm’s productivity
and ultimately that of the supply network. Similarly strategic IIS can provide firms who are
experiencing process uncertainty with, for instance, research information on similar issues that
other firms have addressed. This can then be utilized to take corrective action.
Hypothesis 7a: The performance of a SN with high process uncertainty will be lower than the
performance of a SN with low process uncertainty
Hypothesis 7b: There is a stronger positive relationship between operational IIS and the
performance of the supply network in a SN with high process uncertainty than in a SN with low
process uncertainty.
Hypothesis 7c: There is a stronger positive relationship between strategic IIS and the
performance of the supply network in a SN with high process uncertainty than in a SN with low
process uncertainty.

3.4

Summary
In this chapter the conceptual model was introduced and the typology of IIS, comprised

of the frequency of information shared (low vs. high) and the type of information shared
(strategic vs. operational)2, explained. The arguments for the hypotheses in this manuscript were
developed, drawing on concepts from transaction cost and social network theories. Table 3.2
presents a summary of the hypotheses.

2

In an earlier study (Samaddar et al., 2006) propositions similar to hypotheses 1-4 were presented in which IIS was
classified in terms of the strategic importance of information shared and the volume of information shared.
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Table 3-2.

Summary of Hypotheses

Hypothesis #

Hypothesis Statement

Direct Effects
1a

The single-stage dyadic pattern in a SN is associated with Type 4 IIS (high frequency,
strategic).

1b

The single-stage multiple dyadic SN, is associated with Type 1 IIS (low frequency,
operational).
As the number of stages in the SN increases, the frequency with which operational
information is shared also increases (Type 2 IIS).

2
3a
3b
4a

In the SN, the location of firms close to the consumer (downstream) is associated with Type
4 IIS.
In the SN, the location of firms close to the initial source of raw material (upstream) is
associated with Type 1 IIS.
For a single-stage dyadic SN the association with strategic IIS is stronger with a
centralized coordination structure than with a decentralized coordination structure.

4b

For a single-stage multiple dyadic SN the frequency with which firms share operational
information is higher with a centralized coordination structure than with a decentralized
coordination structure.

4c

As the number of stages in a SN increases, the frequency with which operational
information is shared inter-organizationally is higher with a centralized coordination
structure than with a decentralized coordination structure.
The performance of a SN with high partner information visibility will be higher than the
performance of a SN with low partner information visibility.

5a

6a

The performance of a SN with high variability in supplier capability will be lower than the
performance of a SN with low variability in supplier capability.

7a

The performance of a SN with high process uncertainty will be lower than the performance
of a SN with low process uncertainty.
Moderating Effects
5b (5c)

There is a stronger positive association between operational (strategic) IIS and
performance of the supply network in a SN with low partner information visibility than in a
SN with high partner information visibility

6b

There is a stronger positive association between strategic IIS and the performance of the
supply network in a SN with high variability in supplier capability than in a SN with low
variability in supplier capability.
There is a stronger positive relationship between operational (strategic) IIS and the
performance of the supply network in a SN with high process uncertainty than in a SN with
low process uncertainty.

7b (7c)

All of the hypotheses except for 2 and 4c will be tested empirically. The rationale for the
omission of these two hypotheses will be discussed in Section 4.1.2.
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4.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION

4.1

Research Context
In this study, the unit of analysis is a focal firm, with its immediate upstream, and

downstream transacting parties across a wide variety of industries in the manufacturing sector.
This study goes beyond most empirical studies on supply network relationships, where the unit
of analysis is traditionally the buyer, or the seller, or the buyer-seller dyad to a more
comprehensive study that investigates the supply network.
When investigating, the supply network one can examine either the total supply network
for a firm or a particular product supply network. With the former, the network encompasses all
upstream and downstream (direct and indirect) transacting parties from the raw material’s
original source to the consumer. Examination of the product supply network on the other hand
entails investigating only the linkages that are directly involved, that is, from the manufacturing
to distribution to sale of the product (Harland et al. 2004). Given cost and time constraints, the
more feasible option for this study is the product supply network that addresses only the first tier
upstream and downstream linkages. These linkages can be expected to be the ones that are of
primary importance to a firm in terms of managing the inter-organizational information sharing
needs associated with its products.

4.2

Operationalization of Variables
Multi-item measures were used to operationalize the constructs in the research model and

will be discussed in the following subsections. For the inter-organizational information sharing,
coordination structure, process uncertainty, and supply network performance constructs,
measures from prior research studies were adopted with slight modifications to fit the context of
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this research. In the case of the other constructs (variability in supplier capability, partner
information visibility and network pattern), measures were developed using a modified version
of the procedures suggested by Churchill for developing effective measures (Churchill 1979).
For these constructs we generated a pool of items that appeared to be a reasonable representation
of the constructs as gleaned from a thorough review of relevant literature.
The questions associated with each measure are presented in Appendix B.

4.2.1

Inter-organizational Information Sharing (IIS) Measures
The study of IIS in the literature has historically been from the perspective of the buyer

(Mohr et al. 1996), or the seller (Gavirneni et al. 1999), or the buyer-seller dyad (Ellram et al.
1995; Gavirneni et al. 1999; Lee et al. 2000a; Prahinski et al. 2004; Straub et al. 2004). Many of
the studies are theoretical, using analytical (Aviv 2002; Gavirneni et al. 1999; Lee et al. 2000a;
Li 2002; Yu et al. 2001) or simulation (Fu et al. 2003; Lin et al. 2002; Zhao et al. 2002a) models
to support their arguments. In particular, simulation models have been used extensively when
studying supply networks, since they can more easily capture their complexity, as opposed to the
utility of mathematical models where the extension of results obtained for the dyad to the
network is far from a straightforward inductive process. Very few studies (Malhotra et al. 2005;
Spekman et al. 1998) have, however, performed empirical tests beyond the dyad because of the
complex and often dynamic nature of these networks which makes it difficult to identify and
gather data from all the relevant transacting parties.
Some of the IIS measures that have been used in prior studies are listed in Table 4-1.
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Table 4-1.

Interorganizational Information Sharing measures

Variables
Scope of information
shared
Channel Information
intensity (α=0.87):
Level of Intensity
Commitment
Degree of information
shared
Communication
(α=0.86)

Degree-symmetric
information sharing
(α=0.939)
Symmetry of sharing
w/partners an degree of
information sharing

Breadth

Quality

Measures
Order, operational,
strategic, strategic and
competitive information
Amount of resource flows
Frequency of information
flows
Strategic Importance
Complexity

Study
Seidmann & Sundararajan
(1998)

Partial, full

Gavirneni et al
(1999), Cachon & Fisher
(2000), Aviv (2002)
Chen & Paulraj
(2004)

We share sensitive
information(financial,
production, design,
research, and/or
competition)
Suppliers are provided with
any information that might
help them
We keep each other
informed about events or
changes that may affect the
other party
We exchange performance
feedback
Exchange of information
takes place frequently,
informally and/or in a
timely manner
We have frequent face-toface
planning/communication
Inventory, capacity
planning, cost structures,
margin structures,
production schedules,
marketing strategies and
also
Our organization
a)Shares substantial
strategic info (e.g. prod.
schedule etc.)
b) shares only minimal
transactional info(e.g.
contact info etc.) necessary
to complete the transaction
c) is extremely restrained
with respect to sharing
strategic firm info (e.g.
prod. schedules etc)
with the vendor
Information sharing about
sensed events, changes,
action formulation,
feedback concerning the
changes
Relevance, timeliness,

Vijayasarathy & Robey
(1997)
Spekman et al.
(1998)

Straub et al (2004)

Gosain et al. (2004/2005)
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completeness, value added
Operational exchange
α=0.6367

Advanced shipping notice,
order status, production
schedules, inventory levels

Strategic Information
exchange
α=0.6331

Pricing strategies, new
target markets, new
product development,
distribution strategies,
promotional strategies

Moberg et al. (2002)

Based on a review of the literature and related discussion in Section 2.4, IIS is evaluated
using two measures: (1) the type of information shared (strategic or operational) and (2) the
frequency with which information is shared. Both the type and the frequency of IIS are measured
with respect to an immediate upstream and an immediate downstream partner for the focal firm.
Operational IIS is reflected in the sharing of advanced shipping notice, order status,
production schedules, and inventory levels. Strategic IIS focuses on new target markets, new
product development, distribution strategies, promotional strategies, facility layout, capacity
planning, sourcing plans and research. Our measures are closely aligned to those used by
Moberg, Cultler et al (2002) but have been enhanced in the case of the strategic IIS construct
where we include additional items to provide a richer understanding of this construct.
Strategic and operational IIS are not necessarily mutually exclusive as demonstrated in
Table 4-2 where within the IIS framework a firm may share either only strategic IIS, or only
operational IIS, or both strategic and operational IIS or nothing.
Table 4-2.

No IIS

Interorganizational Sharing (IIS) Options

Only Strategic IIS

Only Operational IIS

Both Strategic and Operational IIS
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To measure the frequency of operational IIS and strategic IIS, a slightly modified version
of the 5- point scale developed by (Becerra et al. 2003) was used. Two additional items were
added to this scale, “never” and “not applicable”, changing the measure to a 7-point scale. In the
former, information is available but the party possessing the information decides not to share it,
while in the latter information is unavailable to any of the transacting parties. The frequency of
IIS and the nature of the IIS (operational or strategic) are mapped to the four different types of
IIS: Types 1 (2) representing operational low (high) frequency and Types 3 (4) representing
strategic low (high) frequency for each of the data points in the sample.
We consider the frequency of operational IIS to be high if it occurs at least weekly, while
the strategic IIS is high if it takes place at least 1-3 times month.

4.2.2

Supply Network Configuration Measures
The structure (or configuration) of the supply network has been characterized in several

ways. In some studies the network is characterized as a physical structure with the potential for
complex linkages (Harland 1996; Lambert et al. 2000). Others take a behavioral approach in
which the network design is characterized by the “pattern of relationships” among transacting
firms (Choi et al. 2002). Sandwiched in between these two approaches is a mixed
characterization that describes both behavioral and physical aspects of the supply network (Stock
et al. 2000). Table 4-3 presents a few of these studies.
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Table 4-3.

Supply Network Structure Measures

Approach
Physical

Physical and Behavioral

Variable

Measures

Levels

Dyadic, external chain,
network

Location

Raw material producer,
fabricator, parts producer,
manufacturer/assembler,
wholesale/distributor, retailer,
consumer
Explicitness and openness of
rules, procedures, and norms
Tiers actively managed
(selection, product
development, problem
resolution) by final assembler

Formalization
Centralization

Physical

Complexity

Number of diff. entities at same
level – horizontal
Number of levels on the system
– vertical
Number of operating locations
-spatial

Horizontal structure

Number of tiers across the
chain
Number of suppliers/customers
within each tier
Horizontal position within the
supply chain
% of suppliers, production
facilities, distribution and
customers located in each
region studied

Vertical structure

Physical and Behavioral

Position of the focal firm within
the supply chain
Geographic dispersion

Channel governance:
1) firms’ relation ship with
suppliers and customers

Cooperation, interdependence,
flexibility, informal
relationship, ongoing
relationship, information
sharing a) with customers and
b) with suppliers

2) Extent of vertical integration

% of each stage in the supply
chain owned by the firm.

Study
Harland (1996)

Choi & Hong (2002)

Lambert & Cooper,
(2000)

Stock et al. (2000)

Our research study which focuses on the configuration of the supply network is more
similar to the physical perspective although the dynamic nature of networks is fully recognized.
The three items used to describe the supply network configuration are: network pattern, number
of stages and location in the network. Similar measures were used by Lambert & Cooper (2000).
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Network Pattern
Our empirical study focuses on two of the network patterns (dyadic, multiple dyadic) that
were presented in Section 2.4.1. Respondents who report transacting with only one other firm
will be recorded as dyadic while those engaged in transactions with multiple firms will be
recorded as multiple dyadic. Both patterns can be reported for a particular product supply
network. For example, a respondent may have multiple suppliers (multiple dyadic) yet the
item/component produced may be customized for a particular customer (dyadic).
Number of Stages
Since the domain of our study is the first tier supply network, we collected data as it
relates to the focal firm and its immediate upstream and downstream partners. Extant literature
reveals that information is normally collected as it relates to either the buyer, the seller or less
frequently the dyad. By empirically studying the interaction of a focal firm with both an
upstream and a downstream firm, this manuscript contributes significantly to the body of
knowledge, on IIS in supply networks that are pursued beyond the conceptual level.
Hypothesis 2 and 4c which requires exploring additional tiers of a supply network is
beyond the scope of this study so will not be covered.
Location in the Network
As discussed in Section 2.4.1, where a firm is located in the network spans the spectrum
from raw material manufacturer to the final consumer. A firm’s location in the network may vary
depending on the product/component under query so each respondent firm will be required to
indicate where they are located, with respect to a particular product/component. Consistent with
New and Payne’s (1995) classification, respondents were asked to select from eight options
(Fig.6), coded from ‘1’ for raw material manufacturer to ‘8’ for consumer. The higher the
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number selected, the closer the location of that firm to the final consumer.

Raw material
manufacturer

Consumer

Raw
material
distributor

Retailer/distributor to
public

Intermediate
product/component
manufacturer

Wholesaler/
distributor

Intermediate
product/component
distributor

Final product
manufacturer

Figure 6. Supply Network Locations (Adapted from New & Payne, 1995)

4.2.3

Coordination Structure Measures
Coordination structure refers to the extent to which one entity has control over the

decision-making for several entities. Significant research has been conducted on coordination
structure at the intra-organizational (Hage et al. 1967), inter-unit (Tsai 2002) and interorganizational levels (Anand et al. 1997; Choi et al. 2002; Dwyer et al. 1987a; John 1984).
For this study, the two determinants of coordination structure were explored:
1) Decision rights - where the authority for decision-making and communication resides
as it relates to interfirm transactions in the supply network (i.e. locus of authority). In other
words, does the power reside within one firm or do firms in the supply chain act independently?
2) Information structure – the kind of information used to facilitate this decision-making
and is related to the following question:Is the information used to arrive at decisions based on
local or global information?
Decision rights is widely used in empirical studies to represent decision-making power
(Tsai 2002), and extent of authority (Dwyer et al. 1987a).
A summary of several of these studies is presented in Table 4-4.
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Table 4-4.

Coordination Structure Measures

Variables

Measures/Questions

Study

Frequency and
importance of
participation in
innovative-related
decisions

Degree of autonomy, frequency of
participation, and amount of influence in
innovative-related decisions

Russell & Russell (1992)

Decision-making power
(α= 0.83)

1) Our business transactions with other units
should be approved by headquarters
2) Any agreement or dispute over the interunit
activities should report to the headquarters and
we should let the headquarters settle the issue.
3) The headquarters has the ultimate power to
decide whether or not we collaborate with
other units in the company

Tsai (2002)

Format: 7-point Likert scale strongly disagree
to strongly agree
Centralization

Retailer’s perception:
1)You go ahead without checking with your
supplier(s)
2)You refer marketing matters to your
suppliers
3)You yield to the recommendation of your
suppliers
4)You rely on your suppliers for an answer

Dwyer & Welsh
(1985)

Format: 5-point Likert scale: never, seldom,
occasionally, rather often, nearly all the time
Extent of Manufacturing
authority

Locus of authority –(5
items)
(α= 0.80)

Participation (7 items)
(α= 0.87)

1)Need for permission
2) Freedom to make local adaptations
3) “Clout” of supplier recommendations and
suggestions
4) Need for higher level approval (later
deleted
Format: 5-point Likert scale
Sample questions:
1)We have little real authority in plan
formulation activities
2)Important marketing planning decisions are
not made by us

1)Plan formulation activities are usually
conducted without our assistance
2)We are required to contribute to the
formulation of strategies and/or budgets in the
plan
Format: 7 point Likert type scale
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Dwyer & Oh
(1987a)

John & Martin
(1984)

Variables

Intra-organizational
Degree of participation in
decision making

Measures/Questions

1) How frequently do you usually participate
in the decision to hire new staff?
2) How frequently do you usually participate
in decisions on the promotion of any of the
professional staff?
3) How frequently do you participate in
decisions on the adoption of new policies?
4) How frequently do you participate in
decisions on the adoption of new programs?

Study

Hage & Aiken
(1967)

Format:1-never, 2-seldom, 3-sometine, 4often, 5-always
Degree of hierarchy of
authority

1) There can be little action taken here until a
supervisor approves a decision
2) A person who wants to make his own
decision would be quickly discouraged here
3) Even small matters have to be referred to
someone higher up for a final answer
4) I have to ask my boss before I do almost
anything
5) Any decision I make has to have my boss’s
approval
Format: 4- point scale from 1- definitely false
to 4 –definitely true

Consistent with the discussion in Section 2.4.2, the appropriate measure should
distinguish between the centralized coordination structure and the decentralized coordination
structure, that is formed from a combination of the decision rights and the information structure.
The 7-items describing the coordination structure measure were adapted from two studies
(Dwyer et al. 1987a; John et al. 1984). These measures embody the key differentiating elements
between the two types of coordination structure that are relevant for our study and include: need
for permission, freedom to make local adaptations, and authority to make strategic decisions.
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4.2.4

Process and Partner Uncertainty
One of the major concerns of supply professionals is the uncertainty existing in the

supply network. Although there is no question in the literature that it exists, the sources are many
and range from internal factors (within the supply network) such as process, supply, demand,
control, (Stevens 1989) to external factors such as technological uncertainty. In this study the
focus is on two types of internal uncertainty: partner and process.
Partner Information Visibility and Variability in Supplier Capability
Two key sources of partner uncertainty are partner information visibility and variability
in supplier capability. Section 2.5.1 indicated that partner information visibility deals with the
adequacy of the information received from a transacting firm to assess the present conditions of
that firm’s (the provider of information) operations. We also discussed, in that section, the
variability in supplier capability which refers to uncertainty arising from the inability to
determine if a supplier has the capability to function effectively, under circumstances which are
different from those prevailing at the time of the contract. New measures were developed for
these two constructs to address the key elements that are relevant for our research context.
Three items were developed for partner (supplier and buyer) information visibility to
measure the accuracy, timeliness, and overall adequacy of the information shared. For, the
supplier capability, six-items were developed to capture the perceived ability of the supplier to
maintain timely delivery and product quality in the event that there are significant
product/component, process or technology interface changes. These items were reverse coded to
reflect the variability in supplier capability construct.
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Process Uncertainty
Earlier in this manuscript, process uncertainty was defined as “fluctuations in process outcomes
and production times due to variable process yields, perishable end-products, machine
breakdowns, etc” (Vorst et al. 1998). Process uncertainty is measured by two items developed by
Bhatnagar and Sohal (2005), Cronbach’s alpha=0.6955 that capture the extent of the fluctuations.
These items are the duration of planned outages and the duration of planned stoppages that
significantly affect a firm’s operations. A 4-point scale (>10%, 6-10%, 1-5%, <1%) was
employed.

4.2.5

Supply Network Performance Measures
Measuring supply network performance in today’s environment represents a challenge

for many firms. Rather than merely looking internally at profitability and how well forecasted
budgets are met, managers must now incorporate metrics that evaluate performance at the
operational, tactical and strategic levels and ones that can also evaluate the total supply network
(Dreyer 2000). Without these measures it will be virtually impossible to integrate supply chains
in a manner that allows effectiveness and efficiency to be maximized thus leading to suboptimal
performance of the supply network (Gunsekaran et al. 2004).
Among the measures that have been used to assess supply network performance are costs,
time (e.g. lead time), flexibility, customer flexibility, supply chain responsiveness, and quality. A
few of these studies are listed in Table 4-5.
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Table 4-5.

Supply Network Performance Measures
Construct

Supply Network
Performance (SC
Performance)

Variables

Measures/questions

Level of joint activity
(Cohen factor =0.70)
Expectation of relationship
Continuing (α=0.88)

Range:Minimal to extensive
(7-point scale) for several diff.
activities
The parties expect this
relationship to last a long
time
Fornat:7pt Strongly Agree
to Strongly Disagree

Study
Heidi and John,
(1990)

The parties make plans
not only for the terms of
the individual purchase
but for the continuance of
the relationship.
Supplier verification
(Cohen factor =0.67)

Supply Network
Performance
(SC Performance)

Level of surveillance that buyer
exercises over the supplier’s
process
Range: Minimal to extensive
evaluation (7 pointt)
Lead Time

Lead Time
Inventory

Inventory Turns
Change in level of Inventory
write-offs

Time to market

Product development life cycle

Quality

Defect rate

Customer Service

Order item fill rate
Stockout situation

Flexibility

Set-up times

Bhatnagar & Sohal
(2004)

For all variables :assessment of
self-improvements and also
perceived improvements
relative to industry over 3 yrs
(much worse, slightly worse,
no change, better, much better0
Supply Network
Performance (SC
Performance)

SC Delivery Reliability

Delivery Performance
Fill Rates
Perfect order Fulfillment

SC Responsiveness

Order Fulfillment Lead times

SC Flexibility

SC Response time
Production Flexibility

SC Costs

Cost of Goods Sold
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Supply chain
Council, 2002 SCOR model;
Guimaraes et al.
(2002)
Items in bold were
eliminated from
Guimaraes’ study

Construct

Variables

Measures/questions

Study

Total SCM Costs
Value-Added Productivity
Warranty/Returns Processing
Costs
SC Asset Management
Efficiency

Supply Network
Performance
(Networked
Organizational
Performance)

Degree-symmetric networked
performance (α =0.943)

Cash-to-cash Cycle Time
Inventory Days of Supply
Asset Turns (Cost of Goods
Sold/Inventory value)
Symmetry and extent of the
following indicators:

Straub et al.
(2004)

Tangible (Effectiveness):
Increased productivity
Lower operating costs:
Intangible (Efficiency):
More timely information
Improved resource control
Increased flexibility
Improved production planning
Improved asset management
Reduced workflow
Plus
Client
a)realized tangible improvements
in performance outcomes
b)realized intangible
improvements in performance
outcomes
c)overall economic situation
improved as a result of relationship
with vendor
Seven point scale: never to always

Excluded from the above studies are single performance indicators that although easy to
use are inadequate to describe network performance (Beamon 1999). The cost metric for
instance, may not include relevant cost categories in addition to other problems such as distortion
of some costs and outdated information (Beamon 1999; Maskell 1991a; Maskell 1991b). In
general, financial performance measures though widely used to measure organizational success
are not appropriate in a network context as they 1) ignore measures that cannot be expressed in
financial terms such as customer service quality, 2) pay scant attention to cross-organizational
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issues, and 3) have no direct links with effectiveness and efficiency considerations (Bullinger et
al. 2002).
A better measure incorporates both financial and non-financial indicators which can be
accomplished using the attributes typically associated with the Supply Chain Operations
Reference (SCOR) model, a process model that has been used by companies to measure the
performance of their operations and make an assessment relative to ‘best practices. Drawing on
this model, the following five variables that are defined (Stephens 2001) and have been
empirically tested (Guimaraes et al. 2002) will be utilized in this study:
•

Supply chain delivery reliability – defined as “the performance of the supply chain in
delivering: the correct product to the correct place, at the correct time, in the correct
condition and packaging, in the correct quantity, with the correct documentation, to
the correct customer”. Measures for this variable are delivery performance to commit
date, fill rates and customer satisfaction with orders.

•

Supply chain responsiveness – defined as “the velocity at which a supply chain
provides products to the customer” and measured by order fulfillment lead times.

•

Supply chain flexibility defined as “the agility of a supply chain in responding to
marketplace changes to gain or maintain competitive advantage”. Since supply chain
flexibility involves flexibility on the part of all network members a more inclusive
measure, responsiveness to changes in customer demand, is used rather than
production flexibility measure used by Guimaraes et al. (2002) .

•

Supply chain costs defined as “the costs associated with operating the supply chain”.
For this variable the items measured are value- added per employee, cost of goods
sold, warranty/ returns processing costs.
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•

Supply chain asset management flexibility defined as the “effectiveness of an
organization in managing assets to support demand satisfaction. This includes the
management of all assets: fixed and working capital.” To capture this variable the
items measured are cash-to-cash cycle time (period during which company finances
its inventory), inventory days of supply, net asset turns (cost of goods sold/inventory
value).

Respondents were asked to assess their firm’s performance in the supply relative to that
of their industry using a 7-point Likert scale (“greatly below average” to “greatly above
average”) to evaluate the following supply network performance indicators: supply chain
delivery, supply chain responsiveness, supply chain flexibility, supply chain costs and supply
chain asset management flexibility. Utilizing a comparative measure avoids having to ask firm
specific questions and eliminates the resistance that some researchers experience from
respondents who consider such information confidential (Bhatnagar et al. 2005). Also assessed,
from the perspective of the respondent, was the performance of one key supplier.

4.2.6

Control Variables
Three variables, that have been found to have an impact on performance, were included

in our model as controls to test for any confounding effects. These variables were 1) the type of
industry within which the firm operates, 2) the numbers of years that the focal firm has been
doing business with the supplier (or customer) and 3) the size of the firm (number of employees).
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Table 4-6 presents a summary of all the constructs in the research model, a description of
the measures, the number of items that were included for each measure and the informing source
for those measures.
Table 4-6.
Summary of Constructs and Operational Measures
Construct/Measures
Measurement Scope
Items
1. Interorganizational Information Sharing –the type and frequency of IIS
Type of information:
Measures whether operational or strategic
Operational
information is shared
OIS1-4,
Strategic
SIS1-8
Frequency of information:
Operational
Strategic

Measures the frequency with which
information is shared.

OISF
SISF

2. Network Configuration - the structure of the inter-organizational arrangement existing
between transacting parties.
Network Pattern
Measures the number of upstream and
NumTTS,
downstream partners in order to ascertain
NumTTC
the type of network (e.g. dyadic or multiStages
dyadic)
Location
Not measured in this study
FLOC
Identifies where the firm is located in the
network.
3. Coordination structure - a pattern of decision-making and communication among a set
of actors who perform tasks in order to achieve goals.
Coordination structure
Measures where the locus of authority for
CS1-7
making decisions resides.

Source
Adapted from
Moberg, Cutler et al
(2002)
Adapted from Becerra
and Gupta (2003)

Adapted from
Lambert & Cooper
(2000)

Adapted from John &
Martin (1984) and
Dwyer and Oh (1987)

4. Partner Uncertainty - reflects the inability to predict the operational status or
capability of a network member due to information asymmetry between supply network
partners.
Partner information invisibility - the extent to which the information provided by a firm
within a network to its partners is adequate to assess the present conditions of that firm’s
operations.
Variability in supplier capability - the level of uncertainty that exists when a firm is unable
to determine if a supplier has the capability to function effectively under circumstances
that differ from those that existed when the agreement (formal or informal) was originally
established.
5. Process Uncertainty - fluctuations in process outcomes and production times due to
variable process yields, perishable end-products, machine breakdowns, etc.
Fluctuations in process
outcomes and production
times

Measures duration of planned shutdown
and unplanned stoppages within the firm
that significantly affect operations
.
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PROCU1-2

Bhatnagar and Sohal
(2005)

Construct/Measures

Measurement Scope

Items

Source

6. Supply Network Performance - The performance of the product/supply network The
indicators below are measured for the supplier (only a, b, and c) and for the firm, relative
to its industry.
a) Delivery reliability
supplier, focal firm

Measures the delivery performance to
commit date, fill rate and customer
satisfaction with orders.

b) Delivery responsiveness
supplier, focal firm

Measures the order fulfillment lead times

SDRESP,
FDRESP

c) Flexibility
supplier, focal firm

Measures responsiveness of a firm to
changes in customer demand

SFLEX,
FFLEX

d) Cost reliability
focal firm

Measures the value added per employee,
cost of goods sold and
warranties/processing costs.

FCR1-3

e) Supply chain asset
management flexibility
focal firm

Measures the cash to cash cycle time,
inventory days of supply and net asset
turns.

FAMF1-3

4.3

Questionnaire Validation

4.3.1

Peer Review

SDREL1-3,
FDREL1-3

Guimares, Cook
et al (2002)

Following consultation with colleagues and academicians involved in supply
management research, the questionnaire was modified to correct any flaws identified such as
poor formatting, complex, ambiguous, biased or incomplete close-ended questions (Dillman
1978; Zikmund 2003). Further refinement of the questionnaire was done based on comments
from two Supply Management professionals who were asked to review the questionnaire for
clarity of instructions, wording, and appropriateness of questions asked.

4.3.2

The Pilot Study
Mail surveys were sent to forty (40) senior level supply management professionals who

are members of the Institute of Supply Management (ISM). These professionals represented a
diverse cross-section of companies. Each survey packet contained three (3) coded self- 83 -

administered questionnaires, one for the recipient (focal firm), and one each for a key buyer and
a key supplier who were part of the same product supply network. As part of the instructions at
the beginning of the questionnaire, the focal firm was asked to consider the questions in the
context of a) a specific item (part/material/subassembly) that generated a significant portion of
the firm’s revenue and b) one that was part of the supply network that included both the supplier
and the customer that was selected to participate in the survey. Included with the questionnaires
was a cover letter explaining the purpose of the survey, and a self-addressed stamped envelope.
The importance of having responses to the survey from all parties (initial recipient, buyer,
and supplier) was emphasized in the cover letter. Two options were provided to the informant on
how to accomplish this task. For the first option, the recipient was asked to simply enter the
contact information for the key buyer and supplier when completing the questionnaire. Provision
of this information implicitly granted permission for us to send the appropriate questionnaire to
the key buyer and supplier identified by the informant. In the other option, the recipient was
instructed to send the two additional surveys provided in the survey packet to the relevant
parties. Although the second choice involved more effort on the part of the recipient it would
allow the information on the buyer and seller to remain private. Six of the packets were returned
as undeliverable, three recipients called to say that they would not be able to fill out the
questionnaire because of changed responsibilities/time constraints/company policies. One
recipient indicated that a response would be sent in a few weeks following the return from an
overseas trip. However, no responses were received even after a second mailing a month later.
During discussions with peers, committee members, and two supply chain professionals
some possible explanations for the lack of response were identified. These included the mere size
of the packet sent which gave the impression that it would entail a lot of time and effort,
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requiring the recipient to sift through three separate sets of questionnaires, and the complexity of
the instructions. It was also noted that the additional steps involved for the second option could
be a deterrent. The questionnaire was modified and another pilot study initiated. In the modified
questionnaire, the respondent was simply asked to include contact information on the supplier
and buyer referenced in his/her completed questionnaire. The new version of the questionnaire
was sent to a random sample of forty senior level supply management professionals drawn from
the ISM list which now excluded the members who had received a questionnaire in the first pilot
study. This resulted in a 12.5% response rate which although lower than many mail surveys is
fairly consistent with several web-based type surveys (Cousins et al. 2006; Klassen et al. 2001).
Only minor changes were made to the questionnaire prior to conducting the full blown
web-based study using e-Rewards (website at http://www.e-rewards.com), a marketing research
organization that provides paid access to a diverse and large pool (over 8000) of supply chain
professionals. Advantages from using on-line studies include geographic reach, speed, flexibility,
convenience to the respondent, and the ease with which data entry and analysis can be
accomplished (Evans et al. 2005). It was important for us to find a company that could
counteract some of the disadvantages of online surveys, identified by these researchers, such as
the potential for the survey invitation to be treated as junk mail, privacy and security issues, and
“representativeness” of the sample. We selected the e-Rewards organization as it is reputed to
have a high quality panel that is acquired through an “invitation only” process and one that is
closely managed to maintain the integrity of its database. Among the claims of the e-Rewards
organization is that it practices strict conformance to industry standards and guidelines as it
relates to the code of conduct when engaged in survey research.
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The initial plan to collect matched pair responses from the focal firm and its key
downstream and upstream partner had to be modified to satisfy the requirement for anonymity of
the participants involved in the online survey. Consequently, only the informant’s view of the
transacting parties, both the immediate upstream supplier and the downstream customer, was
collected. We would have preferred to have matched pairs or multiple informants (even though
the resulting sample size would be smaller) as it has been claimed that this produces more
reliable and valid information (Bagozzi et al. 1991; Seidler 1974).While single informants give a
one sided view which could lead to some bias, scholars have suggested that single informant bias
can be minimized by utilizing knowledgeable managers on the topic of interest (Huber et al.
1985; Kumar et al. 1993). Thus we selected senior level purchasing executives and managers
who are actively involved in supply management.

4.4

Data Collection Method
The survey method of inquiry was selected as the most appropriate approach for the

present study that focuses on product supply networks. Investigating characteristics for this
empirical domain and drawing inferences for the total population can best be analyzed through a
well-constructed standardized questionnaire. Also important is a probability sample that has been
selected using the appropriate sampling technique (Babbie 1998).
The decision to employ the survey method rather than one of the other methods available
for empirical research was based on a comparison of several research strategies. Simulation,
surveys and field studies offer the most natural setting; however, since results from field studies
are not normally generalizable, that method was removed from the scope of study. Although
simulation can be created to mirror "real-world" phenomena being examined and are often
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generalizable, the strength and range of variables is not as great as for surveys where data is
collected directly from the population being sampled. This is important in this study that looks at
the association between variables, since there is a direct relationship between measures of
association such as the correlation coefficient and the range of the correlated variables (Stone
1978). Additionally, the survey approach provides the ability to control for the effects of any
confounding influences should this become necessary, using statistical techniques.

4.5

Data Sample
E-mails were sent by the e-Rewards firm to supply management professionals in the

manufacturing industry who are members of one of their research panels inviting them to
participate in our online survey. The manufacturing industry, which represents approximately
61% of workers in the goods producing sector, includes a wide cross-section of companies. The
diverse selection of companies in this sampling frame enables external validity and increases the
potential for having dyadic and multiple dyadic network patterns in our sample.
The invitation was sent to middle and upper level managers in the purchasing, and supply
management divisions, an approach that has been used in prior studies involving buyer-supplier
relationships (Carr et al. 1999; Chen et al. 2004). These managers are most likely to generate the
highest quality of information since they are answering questions that are within their area of
expertise (Campbell 1955). In return for filling out the survey each participant received, from the
online survey company, incentives in the form of “currency” that could be redeemed later for
products/services such as books, magazines, travel and entertainment.
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4.5.1

Screening of Respondents
A screening question was included at the beginning of the survey in an effort to eliminate

respondents who only had a minor involvement in activities and decision-making issues related
to their firm’s supply networks. Those who indicated that they had less than 30% involvement
were not allowed to continue with the questionnaire.

4.5.2

Sample Size
Of the 600 survey invitations that were started, 211 were completed (completion rate

35.17%). Thirty eight (38) questionnaires were discarded during the purification process
primarily due to either an unrealistic (too short) time to complete the survey, unsuitable
respondent based on title (e.g. clerk) , or incorrect information. A questionnaire was considered
as having incorrect information if the respondent indicated that no strategic information was
shared yet entered the frequency of strategic information sharing as 1 to 3 times per month, for
instance. Incidents of missing information were kept to a minimum owing to the design of the
questionnaire which forced the respondent to enter a response before moving to the next
question. Our final sample comprised data from 173 respondents, each providing two data points,
one concerning transactions with first tier suppliers and the other for transactions with first tier
customers. As a result our effective sample size was 346 data points.

4.5.3

Adequacy of Sample Size
One concern typically in research that entails hypothesis testing is having a large enough

sample size to achieve a desired power based on the significance level selected and the effect
size. Our sample size was assessed by referencing the table developed by (Cohen 1992) that
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provides the recommended sample size for specific analytical techniques, given the effect size,
significance level and the power. For our research model, the decision criteria is 0.05 for the
significance level which is typical in behavioral statistical inference tests (Murphy 2002), power
is 0.80 as recommended by (Cohen 1992) and we assume a medium effect size. Based on these
tables we need a sample size of 87 for a chi-square tests (1 degree of freedom). The multiple
regression analysis with up to eight independent variables will require a sample size of 87. In
terms of the ability to detect a significant R2 with multiple regression analysis, (Hair et al. 1998)
suggests that with power of 0.80, a significance level of 0.05 and two independent variables we
should be able to detect R2 values of as little as 4% with a sample size of 250 and values of 10%
with a sample size of 100. Our sample size of 346 appears adequate for our research models that
include for example, regression analysis with two (2) independent variables.

4.5.4

Respondent Information
Respondents had on average between 5 and10 years experience working with their firm

The number of years that the firm was involved with the key partner selected was approximately
3.8 years. A summary of the demographics of the respondents and the industries represented and
are presented in Tables 4-7 and Table 4-8 respectively.
Table 4-7.

Respondent Demographics
Respondent’s Job Title

Frequency

Percent

Top Executive (President, CPO, CEO,COO, EVP)

14

8.1

General Manager

18

10.4

Department Head

29

16.8

Director/Assistant Director

5

2.8

Senior Manager/Senior Buyer/Purchasing Manager

50

28.9

Buyer/Assistant Manager

33

19.1

Other

24

13.9

Total

173

100.0
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Table 4-8.

Summary of Industries and Revenue Data
Frequency

%

1- Textile

4

2.3

2 - Automotive

7

4.0

3 – Chemicals/Pharmaceuticals

18

10.4

4 – Computer &Peripherals

5

2.9

5 - Electronics

17

9.8

6 – Food and Beverage

21

12.1

7 - Telecommunications

10

5.8

8 - Transportation

35

20.2

9 - Semiconductor

5

2.9

10 - Other

51

29.5

Total

173

100.00

Revenue ($)

Frequency

%

<10 million

44

25.5

10 -49.9 million

17

9.8

50 – 99.9 million

21

12.1

100 – 499.9 million

26

15.0

500 – 999.9 million

20

11.6

1 billion – 5 billion

33

19.1

Over 5 billion

12

6.9

173

100.0

Industry

Total

4.5.5

Nonresponse Bias
In order to investigate non-response bias we examined data on firm purchases, and

number of employees for early respondents and late respondents under the premise that there is a
similarity between non-respondents and those who respond at a later date (Armstrong et al.
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1977). ANOVA tests revealed no significant difference (p>.05) between the top 10% and the
bottom 10% of the respondents.

4.5.6

Selection Bias
One concern with asking a respondent to select a key partner is that the one selected

would be one with whom there was a close relationship and by extension strategic IIS. This bias
was however not detected in our data set. In fact respondents indicated, for the partners selected,
no strategic IIS in 16% of the cases.

4.5.7

Common Method Variance
Perceptual measures and the methods that are used to measure constructs can lead to

common method variance defined as “variance that is attributable to the measurement method
rather than to the constructs the measures represent” (Podsakoff et al. 2003). This has generated
concern from some researchers due to the potential for the misinterpretation of the results
(Bagozzi et al. 1990; Lindell et al. 2001; Podsakoff et al. 2003; Podsakoff et al. 1986).
We sought to address these concerns in our research by:
a) undertaking precautionary measures prior to data collection and
b) conducting post hoc tests
During the design phase of our questionnaire we adopted some of the suggestions
recommended by Podsakoff et al (2003) such as the use of unambiguous, easy to understand
words with very few instances of reverse coded items, and a variety of response formats (for
example, Likert and Semantic comparison scales). Additionally, respondents were assured that
their responses would be anonymous to reduce the potential for bias.
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Following the collection of data, we conducted the Harmon’s single factor test, a posthoc procedural method, (Podsakoff et al. 1986) which is a statistical procedure used to test for
common method variance and is used widely in academic research (Kotabe et al. 2003; Lambe et
al. 2002; Paulraj et al. 2005; Zhao et al. 2002b). In this test, common method variance is verified
if a factor analysis produced only one factor that accounts for the majority of the covariance
between the independent and the criterion variables (Podsakoff et al. 1986). The ten factors
extracted using principal components factor analysis (eigenvalues greater than 1) explained 70%
of the variance extracted of which only approximately 21.9% was accounted for by the first
factor.
In addition to the above actions, we also compared the annual sales revenue for 2006 as
reported by respondents on the survey to that provided to E-rewards as part of their panel
information. This resulted in a fairly strong correlation of 0.56 thus providing some additional
indication of the effectiveness of our measures.
Based on the above precautionary measures undertaken a priori, the results of the
Harmon’s single factor test and the correlation as it relates to annual sales revenue, we conclude
that common method variance should not be a major concern for this study.
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5.

MEASUREMENT VALIDATION AND DATA ANALYSIS

Because of the complexity of our model, our data analysis in this study was conducted in two
parts. The first part of the model investigates the relationship between the supply network
configuration and IIS (hypotheses 1a-1b). In part two we examine the relationship between IIS
and performance (hypotheses 5a–7c). Such an approach is appropriate since the mediating effect
of IIS is not being investigated in our study.
Several techniques were used to explore the relationships in our model. Initial
examination of the data utilizing univariate (e.g. histograms) and bivariate (e.g, scatter plots and
box plots) methods were done to help us understand the distributional aspects of our variables,
the relationships between these variables and the identification of extreme outliers and influential
cases. We conducted correlational analysis, cross-tabulations and chi-square tests for Part 1 of
the research model. Additionally we employed t-tests for assessing the differences between the
means of variables in our model (Parts 1 and 2). Regression analysis formed the basis for our
assessment on the effects of the moderator variables, as recommended by Baron and Kenny
(1986). Interaction plots were also created to graphically display instances where the effect of the
moderator was found to be significant.

5.1

Measurement Validation

5.1.1

Unidimensionality, Reliability and Validity Considerations
The assessment of the effectiveness of measures is important to empirical research as it

permits researchers to determine their consistency and accuracy. Measures can be assessed in
terms of their unidimensionality, reliability and validity.
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Unidimensionality is concerned with whether or not all the items included in a construct
are measuring only that construct. Typically factor loadings of 0.5 and above are required with
loadings being highest on the construct that it represents (Hair et al. 1998). Using SPSS 16.0 we
ran a factor analysis with the principal components extraction method and Varimax rotation.
Components with eigenvalues greater than one were extracted. Items that had a low factor
loading were evaluated and those items that also caused a significant drop in Cronbach’s alpha
(α) were deleted. Items with high factor loadings were retained.
Reliability relates to how measures are made and involves getting consistent results for
measures over repeated trials; validity on the other hand relates to what should be measured and
is concerned with “the soundness and relevance of a proposed interpretation” (Cronbach 1990;
Hair et al. 1998). An appropriate question then for determining the validity of a measure would
be:how successful was the researcher at measuring what he/she intended to measure? Similarly
an appropriate question for determining reliability would be: how accurate was the measuring
instrument used to assess the construct being studied?
The technique selected for examining reliability of the measurement model in this study
is internal consistency reliability which is used to assess the consistency of results across items
within a test. Cronbach’s alpha, is one of the measures that is most frequently used although
there are several other measures available such as average inter-item correlation, average item to
total correlation and split half reliability (Trochim). Constructs with Cronbach’s alpha values
above 0.7 indicate high reliability, with values of 0.60 acceptable for newly developed scales
(Nunally 1978).
Table 5-1 presents the factor loadings and the Cronbach’s alpha measure for each scale.
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Table 5-1.

Summary of Measures to Assess Reliability and Validity of Constructs

Variable Name

Items

Operational IIS

OIS1

0.712

OIS2

0.815

OIS3

0.761

OIS4

0.671

SIS1

0.849

SIS2

0.739

SIS3

0.818

SIS4

0.850

Strategic IIS

Partner Information Visibility

Factor Loadings

Cronbach's α

SIS5

0.596

SIS6*

0.415*

SIS7*

0.488*

SIS8

0.714

PII1

0.774

PII2

0.805

PII3

0.768

Variability in Supplier

SVPC1

0.717

capability

SVPC2

0.741

SVPC3

0.779

SVPC4

0.749

SVPC5

0.797

SVPC6

0.814

CS1

0.733

CS2

0.799

CS3

0.675

0.780

0.893

*Retained – alpha
otherwise 0.879

0.897

0.909

Supply Network Measures
Level of Centralization

Process Uncertainty
Performance –Supplier – Measure 1

Performance - Focal Firm – Measure 1

Performance - Focal Firm – Measure 2

CS4

0.729

PROCU1

0.803

PROCU2

0.686

SDREL1

0.751

SDREL2

0.778

SDREL3

0.783

SDRESP

0.695

SFLEX

0.684

FDREL1

0.873

FDREL2

0.846

FDREL3

0.847

FDRESP

0.777

FFLEX

0.512

FCR1

0.613

FCR2

0.750

FCR3

0.720

FAMF1

0.775

FAMF2

0.718

FAMF3

0.731
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0.750

0.623

0.910

0.879

0.843
0.87 when measure 1
and 2 combined

For almost all measures, the individual item loadings were greater than 0.7 and Cronbach’s alpha
greater than 0.75. Measures with item loadings less than 0.7 were retained based on theoretical
considerations.
Construct validity refers to the extent to which a measure represents the theoretical
construct of interest and can be tested by examining “1) the extent to which the measure
correlates with other measures designed to measure the same thing and 2) whether the measure
behaves as expected” (Churchill 1979). Two of the most widely used validities to verify
construct validity are convergent validity and discriminant validity. With convergent validity all
the measures of the same concept should be highly correlated (Hair et al. 1998). Discriminant
validity on the other hand is reflected when there is low correlation among measures that are not
theoretically related (Churchill 1979).
We assessed convergent validity using Cronbach’s alpha values (Carmines et al. 1979;
Hulland 1999) with values of at least 0.7 indicating that the items used to measure a construct are
closely aligned to each other. Such values are shown for all but the process uncertainty construct
which had a value of 0.623 but was retained based on theoretical considerations. For
discriminant validity the correlation between each construct and its indicators should be greater
than the correlation of that construct with any other construct.
A bivariate correlational analysis was conducted using Spearman’s correlation for a twotailed test of statistical significance at two levels (p<.01 and p<.05). Using Rowntree’s (1981)
heuristics as reported by Kin-wai Lau (2007) we note that moderate correlations (0.4 -0.7) were
obtained for most of the within measures items with low (0.2-0.4) to negligible (0.0-0.2)
measures for between item measures. The within measure results are consistent with the findings
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from the exploratory factor analysis. Based on our analysis we conclude that the data falls within
the required thresholds for construct validity.

Table 5-2.

Item-to-Item Correlations - Relationship between SN Configuration and IIS

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
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Table 5-2.
(cont’d)

Item-to-Item Correlations - Relationship between SN Configuration and IIS

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
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Table 5- 3.

Item-to-Item Correlations – Relationship between IIS and SN Performance

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
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Table 5-3. Item-to-Item Correlations: Relationship between IIS and SN Performance
(contd)

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

- 100 -

Table 5-3. Item-to-Item Correlations:Relationship between IIS and SN Performance
(contd)

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
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5.2

Examination of Data
Summated scales were created for all of the multi-item measures. Additionally scales

were created to represent the different IIS typologies associated with operational IIS, strategic
IIS and frequency of IIS. Box plots identified only a few points that were outliers but most of
these were within tolerable limits since their removal did not make a noticeable impact on the
results. Two outliers that were isolated from the other points in box plots showed up as extreme
points (>3 std. deviations) in a regression analysis report. Following further investigation it was
decided to also retain these cases since the slope coefficients did not change significantly when
they were removed, as would have occurred if they were influential cases.
A series of tables and plots are presented to get a better understanding of our data. A
breakdown of the types and frequency of IIS is presented in Tables 5-4 to 5-7. Information on the
supply network pattern is presented in Tables 5-8 to 5-10. Finally a cross-tabulation of the type
of IIS by firm location is presented in Tables 5-11 and 5-12.

Table 5-4.

Types of Operational IIS

Type of IIS

Frequency

Production schedules

234

Advanced shipping notices

271

Order Status

289

Inventory Levels

232

Results from Table 5-4 indicate that advanced shipping notices and order status were the
most frequent types of operational IIS while information on inventory levels and production
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schedules were the least although the difference between the most and least frequent was less
than 60.

Table 5-5.

Types of Strategic IIS

Type of IIS

Frequency

Target Markets

141

Product Development

217

Distribution Strategies

163

Promotional Strategies

153

Facility Layout

153

Capacity Planning

185

Sourcing Plans

160

Research

149

Table 5-5 shows that for strategic IIS, product development followed by capacity
planning were the most frequent types of IIS. Here the difference between the most and the least
frequent IIS was less than 80.

Next we examine the cross-tabulations of strategic and operational IIS in Table 5-6.
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Table 5-6.

Cross-tabulations for Operational and Strategic IIS

Strategic IIS
No

Total

Yes

Operational

No

14

10

24

IIS

Yes

43

279

322

57

289

346

Total

From Table 5-6 we note that most of the firms are engaged in operational and strategic IIS with
only fourteen firms pursuing purely market transactions entailing no IIS. On the contrary 10
respondents were classified as only strategic IIS while for 43 it was only operational IIS.

Table 5-7.

Frequency of IIS

Operational

Strategic

Not Applicable

0

7

Never

1

49

Rarely

60

69

Most months w/in year

58

100

1-3times/month

52

53

Weekly

91

34

Most days

70

20

From Table 5-7 we note that the frequency distribution for operational IIS is different from that
for strategic IIS. The majority of the firms engage in operational IIS on a weekly basis while for
strategic IIS this happens at a less frequent interval of most months within the year.
The network patterns are presented in Table 5-8.
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Table 5-8.

Network Pattern Summary

Network Pattern

Dyadic
Multiple Dyadic

Frequency
Count
46

Percent
%
13.5

300

86.5

Indications from Table 5-8 are that the vast majority of the respondents transact with multiple
firms. A more detailed view is presented in Table 5-9 where the network patterns are broken
down by the Type of IIS between the focal firm and the transacting parties. Again, each Type of
IIS represents a combination of the information, (operational or strategic) and the frequency with
which this information is shared. Thus Type 1 IIS is low frequency operational IIS while Type 2
is high frequency operational.

Table 5-9.

Cross-tabulation for Network Pattern and Type of IIS
Types of IIS

Network
Pattern

Dyadic
Multiple Dyadic

Total

Type 1

Type 2

Type 3

Type 4

Operational

Operational

Strategic

Strategic

Low freq.

High freq.

Low freq.

High freq.

14

19

22

16

151

128

167

84

165

147

189

100

The cells in the above table reflect a count of the different types of IIS within our sample based
on the network pattern. The cell counts, as it relates to type of IIS, are not mutually exclusive as
a firm that shares Type 1 IIS could also share Type 3 IIS for example. Unique (mutually
exclusive) instances are presented later in Table 5-10.
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A visual display of Table 5-9 is presented in figure 7.
167

151

Frequency count

128

84

22

19

16

14

Type 1

Dyadic
Mulitple Dyadic

Type 2

Type 3

Type 4

Type of IIS

Figure7. Bar chart for Type of IIS by Network Pattern

Table 5-10.

Summary of Unique Instances of Types of IIS by Network Pattern

Network Pattern

Dyadic
Multiple Dyadic

Total

Type 1

Type 2

Type 3.

Type 4.

Total

3

2

0

0

5

26

12

6

4

48

29

14

6

4

53

For the mutually exclusive types of IIS in our data, the dyadic pattern shows very few instances
with only operational IIS (Type 1 and Type 2) and none for only strategic IIS (Type 3 and Type
4). In the case of the multiple dyadic pattern, instances of only strategic IIS occur less frequently
than those for only operational IIS. For both network patterns, operational IIS occurs most
frequently.
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In Tables 5-11 and 5-12 we look at the distribution of the type of IIS based on firm location.
Data in these two tables exclude the two endpoints, that is, the initial raw material source and the
consumer since our focus is on the locations that are close to these two endpoints.
Table 5-11.

Summary of Unique Instances of Types of IIS by Firm Location

Types of IIS

Firm

Near Initial Raw

Location

Material Source

Type 1

Type 2

Operational

Operational

Strategic

Strategic

Low freq.

High freq.

Low freq.

High freq.

Near Consumer

Total

Type 3

Type 4

9

4

1

0

20

8

4

2

29

12

5

2

In the above table, the largest frequency counts are for Type 1 IIS and the smallest for Type 4
IIS. Note that the cell counts shown reflect unique instances for each type of IIS.
Table 5-12.

Crosstabulation for Type of IIS by Firm Location

Type of IIS

Firm

Near Initial Raw

Location

Material Supplier
Near Consumer

Type 1

Type 2

Type 3

Type 4

Operational

Operational

Strategic

Strategic

Low freq.

High freq.

Low freq.

High freq.

53

49

68

22

101

94

112

61

In Table 5-12, Type 3 IIS has the highest frequently while the smallest frequency count is for
Type 4 IIS. A visual display of this table is presented in Figure 8.
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Near initial raw mat'l supplier

Near consumer
112

101
94

68
61
53
49

22

Type 1

Type 2

Type 3
Type of IIS

Figure 8. Bar chart for Type of IIS by Firm Location
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Type 4

5.3

Test of Hypotheses
For our analysis we examine the following:
•

the relationship between supply network configuration and IIS (H1a, H1b, H3a, H3b),

•

the role of the coordination structure as it relates to the SN pattern and IIS (H4a,
H4b),

•

the direct effect of partner information visibility (H5a), variability in supplier
capability (H6a) and process uncertainty on supply network performance (H7a)

•

the moderating effect of these uncertainty variables on the relationship between IIS
and supply network performance (H5b, H5c, H6b, H7b).

5.3.1

Tests of the Relationship between the Supply Network Configuration and IIS

Two elements of the supply network configuration are tested: the network pattern and the
location of the firm in the supply network.
Hypothesis 1a and 1b
Hypotheses 1a and 1b investigate the relationship between the network pattern and IIS.
According to hypothesis 1a, we posit that a single stage dyadic SN will engage in Type 4 IIS. We
posit that for a multiple dyadic SN it will be Type 1 IIS. To statistically test our null hypothesis
that the relationship between network pattern and type of IIS are independent, we use the chisquare test of independence. Data was adjusted prior to conducting our analysis to exclude
instances of double counts arising from the sharing of both Type 1 and Type 4 IIS. Table 5-13
presents the observed and the expected cell frequencies for each cell. Divergence from the
observed values in each cell is indicated by these expected frequencies.
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Table 5-13.

Type of IIS by Network Pattern
Type of IIS

Netwk

Dyadic

Pattern

Operational

Strategic

Low freq

High freq

Type 1

Type 4

Total

12(16.7)

14(9.3)

26

%Netwk Pattern

46.2%

53.8%

100%

Multiple Dyadic

134(129.3)

67(71.7)

201

%Netwk Pattern

66.7%

33.3%

100%

146

81

227

64.3%

35.7%

100%

Total

χ2=4.221, p-value =.05. Numbers in parenthesis are the expected frequency counts

An examination of Table 5-13 indicates that Type 4 IIS is more frequently associated
with the dyadic pattern than Type 1 IIS and the observed frequencies are also noticeably
different than the expected frequencies. These observations suggest that firms in a dyadic pattern
are more likely to engage in Type 4 IIS than in Type1 IIS.
In the case of the multiple dyadic pattern, we observe Type1 IIS is more frequently
associated with this pattern than is Type 4 IIS. Here too, the observed frequencies are different
than the expected frequencies. These results imply that there is an association between the
multiple dyadic pattern and Type1 IIS.
These findings are further reinforced by the differences observed in the row percentages
for both columns. For instance, in the Type 4 IIS column, we observe that the percentage of the
sample engaging in Type 4 IIS is much larger for the dyadic network pattern (53.8%) than for
either the multiple dyadic pattern (33.3%) or overall (35.7%).
In general, the differences between the expected and actual frequency counts and
between the row percentages suggest that these associations are not due to chance. Our findings
which are statistically significant (χ2 =4.221, p =.04) imply that dyadic patterns are associated
with Type 4 IIS and multiple dyadic patterns are associated with Type 1 IIS. Based on these
results we conclude that there is support for hypotheses 1a and 1b.
Hypothesis 3a and 3b
We now analyze and present our findings for hypothesis 3a and 3b which examines the
relationship between firm location and type of IIS.
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Our data set excluded respondents at either endpoint of the location continuum. In addition, firms
sharing both Type 1 (operational low frequency) IIS and Type 4 (strategic high frequency IIS)
are excluded from the analysis since our inquiry concerns the differences between these two
groups. Thus the frequency counts in Table 5-14 are slightly lower than those in Table 5-12.
Hypothesis 3a postulated that firms located close to the initial raw material source, in the SN,
would be associated with Type 1 IIS. Hypothesis 3b postulated that firms located close to the
consumer would be associated with Type 4 IIS. Table 5-14 presents the results.

Table 5-14.

Cross-tabulation of Firm Location and IIS

Type of IIS
Operational Strategic
Low freq High freq
Type 1
Firm location Near to Initial Raw Mat’l supplier

48(43.5) 17(21.5)

% Within Firm Location
Near to consumer

Type 4 Total

73.8%

26.2% 100%

92(96.5) 52(47.5)

% Within Firm Location

63.9%

Total

140
67%

65

144

36.1% 100%
69

209

33% 100%

χ2 = 2.005, p-value=0.156. Numbers in parenthesis are the expected frequency counts

For firms located near to the initial raw material supplier there are noticeable differences
between the expected and observed frequencies with an observed count less than expected for
Type 4 IIS and more than expected for Type 1 IIS. These findings suggest that firms near to the
initial raw material supplier would be more prone to Type 1 IIS.
In the case of firms located near to the consumer the expected and observed frequencies
differ with the counts being higher than expected for Type 4 IIS and less than expected for Type
1 IIS.
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The row percentages associated with the first column show that overall 67% of the firms
in the sample engage in Type 1 IIS. Of those firms located near to the initial raw material
supplier, 73.8% engage in Type 1 IIS while it is 63.9% for those located near to the consumer.
The row percentages associated with the right column are much smaller with 33% of the firms
overall engaged in Type 4 IIS, 26.2% for those firms near to the initial raw material supplier and
36.2% for firms that are near to the consumer.
Differences in the row percentages and between the expected and observed cell
frequencies suggest that there is a relationship between the Type of IIS and firm location
however the results of the chi-square test of independence indicate that these differences are not
statistically significant (χ2 = 2.008, p=0.156). Consequently we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that there is no association between the types of IIS and firm location and conclude that there is
no support for hypotheses 3a and 3b.
Hypothesis 4a and 4b
For these hypotheses we employ the Student’s t-test to compare means in a centralized
coordination structure and a decentralized coordination structure as it relates to
a) Strategic IIS – hypothesis 4a
b) Frequency of operational IIS – hypothesis 4b.
Hypothesis 4a postulated that for a single-stage dyadic SN, strategic IIS is stronger with a
centralized coordination structure than with a decentralized coordination structure. The subsample dataset used to test this hypothesis contains only firms in a single stage dyadic SN that
engage in strategic IIS. We create two groups (one for firms with a centralized coordination
structure and the other for firms with a decentralized coordination structure) from this dataset.
Tests are performed for skewness and kurtosis, since the size of both samples are less than 30, to
determine if the distributions are fairly normal. The skewness and kurtosis values for the
centralized coordination structure are -0.56 and 0.53 respectively. In the case of the decentralized
coordination structure the values are -0.22 and -0.517 which are well within the desired range of
-1 to +1. A two sample Student’s t-test assuming unequal variance was performed to test the
hypothesis that the decentralized coordination structure has a mean strategic IIS that is greater
than or equal to that of the centralized coordination structure for firms in single stage dyadic
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SNs. Results indicate that the mean strategic IIS for SNs with a centralized coordination
structure was significantly greater than that for SNs with a decentralized coordination structure,
t (36) =2.35, p=0.012. These findings provide support for hypothesis 4a.
Hypothesis 4b proposed that for a single stage multiple dyadic SN, the frequency with which
firms shared operational IIS is stronger with a centralized coordination structure than with a
decentralized coordination structure. To test this hypothesis we create a sub-sample dataset
comprised of only the multiple dyadic network pattern. The frequency of operational IIS in this
dataset is then separated into two groups (centralized and decentralized coordination structure).
Results from the two sample Student’s t-test performed, assuming unequal variances, are
statistically significant, t (263) =1.77, p=0.039. Our results confirm that the mean frequency with
which operational information is shared is significantly higher in a centralized coordination
structure than in a decentralized coordination structure for the multiple dyadic SN. This indicates
support for hypothesis 4b.
5.3.2

Test of the Direct Effects of Uncertainty on Performance
In hypotheses 5a, 6a, 7a we investigate the impact of partner information visibility,

variability in supply capability and process uncertainty on SN performance. The low and high
categories for each of these uncertainty variables were determined by a median split (Cheema et
al. 2008; Ghosh et al. 1997; Wiesenfeld et al. 2007).
Hypothesis 5a posited that the performance of a SN with high partner information visibility
would be higher than the performance of a SN with low partner information visibility. A two
sample Student’s t-test is performed to test the null hypothesis that the mean performance for
low partner information visibility is the same or less than that for low partner information
visibility, assuming unequal variance. Results indicate a p-value <.05, t= -6.17 for the one-tailed
test, consequently we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is statistical evidence in
support of our hypothesis.
Hypothesis 6a proposed that the performance of a SN with high variability in supplier capability
would be lower than the performance of a SN with low variability in supplier capability. In this
case the Fischer’s test indicates that the variances were equal. As a result, a two sample Student’s
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t-test, using the pooled estimate of the variance is performed to test the null hypothesis that the
mean performance for high variability in supplier capability is the same or greater than that for
low variability in supplier capability. The mean performance for high variability in supplier
capability is significantly lower than that for low variability in supplier capability, t=7.10,
p<.001. These results provide evidence in support of our hypothesis on the relationship between
SN performance and variability in supplier capability.
Hypothesis 7a posited that the performance of a SN with high process uncertainty would be
lower than the performance of a SN with low process uncertainty. The Student’s t-test is
performed assuming unequal variance to test the null hypothesis that the performance of a SN
with high process uncertainty is equal to or higher than the performance with low process
uncertainty. The results are statistically significant thus providing support for this hypothesis.
Table 5-15. Summary of the Results for the Direct Effects of Model Variables on SN
Performance
Hypothesis N
Low (High) Partner
information visibility
H5a
Low (High) Variability in
supplier capability
H6a
Low (High) Process
Uncertainty
H7a

5.3.3

Mean

Std Dev

F-test

t-test

199(141) 79.50(87.26)

11.56(11.20) 1.06(0.351) 6.17, p<.0001

162(180) 87.29(78.68)

10.23(12.01) 1.37(0.018) 7.10, p<.0001

173(171) 84.46(81.06)

11.66(12.04) 0.937(0.337) 2.66, p<0.004

Test of the Quasi-Moderating Role of Various Uncertainty Parameters on the
Relationship between IIS and SN Performance
Our research model hypothesized that partner information visibility, variability in

supplier capability, and process uncertainty all moderated the relationship between IIS and
performance. To test these hypotheses we investigate the interaction effects using regression
analysis which is more appropriate when the moderator is measured on a quantitative scale,
producing superior statistical power (Cohen et al. 2003; Frazier et al. 2004). The moderating
variables were mean-centered prior to calculating the product terms to reduce the potential for
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the effects of multicollinearity (Aiken et al. 1991; Jaccard et al. 1990). We then utilize the
moderated regression approach which involves three regression equations as follows:
1. Model 1: a baseline model with only the predictor variables and control variables
2. Model 2: a main effects model with the moderator variable added
3. Model 3: a model which builds on model 2 by introducing an interaction term
To test for the presence of a moderating variable we compare the models to determine if:
1. Adjusted R2 increased on addition of the interaction term to the model
2. The standardized coefficients for the interaction term is significant
3. The main effect between the criterion and predictor variable is significant.
An interaction plot is presented in any situation where all of these three criteria are met. In all of
the subsequent regression analyses performed, the control variables are insignificant and all the
variance inflation factors are below 2.0 indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem.
Hypothesis 5b posited that there would be a stronger positive association between
operational IIS in the SN with low partner information visibility than with high partner
information visibility. Table 5-16 presents the results.
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Table 5-16. Results of Regression Analysis: Effects of Operational IIS and Partner
Information Visibility on Supply Network Performance (standardized beta coefficients)
Variables

Control variables
Industry
Years with partner
Firm size
Independent variables
Operational IIS
Partner Information Visibility

Model 1
β (T-value)
Controls

Model 2
β (T-value)
w/Independent
variables

w/Interactions

0.035 (0.642)
0.081 (1.401)
-0.016 (-0.275)

0.035 (0.677)
0.076 (1.380)
-0.029 (-0.522)

0.033 (0.634)
0.077 (1.389)
-0.030 (-0.536)

0.215 (3.872)***

0.126 (2.275)*
0.303 (5.509)***

0.131 (2.329)*
0.307 (5.538)***

Interaction
Partner Information
Visibility*Operational IIS
Adj. R2
R2 change
F change

Model 3
β (T-value)

0.030 (.553)
0.046
0.058
4.874***

0.128
0.142
10.358***

0.126
0.142
8.664***

Dependent variable: SN Performance
*p<.05, **p<.01, *** p<.001.

An examination of our results indicates that the variance (adjusted R2) in SN performance
explained by operational IIS increases from 4.6% to 12.8% with the addition of partner
information visibility variable but decreases slightly to 12.6% when the interaction term of
partner information visibility and operational IIS is introduced in Model 3. The beta coefficient
for the interaction term is not statistically significant. Based on these results, we conclude that
there is no support for hypothesis 5b.
Hypothesis 5c posited that there would be a stronger positive association between
strategic IIS in the SN with low partner information visibility than with high partner information
visibility. The results of the regression analysis show that the interaction between partner
information visibility and strategic IIS is not statistically significant. Table 5-17 presents the
results of our analysis.
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Table 5-17. Results of Regression Analysis: Effects of Strategic IIS and Partner
Information Visibility on Supply Network Performance (standardized beta coefficients)
Variables

Control variables
Industry
Years with partner
Firm Size
Independent variables
Strategic IIS
Partner Information Visibility

Model 1
β (T-value)
Controls

Model 2
β (T-value)
w/Independent
variables

w/Interactions

0.011 (0.189)
0.106 (1.775)
-0.032 (-0.527)

0.011 (0.202)
0.099 (1.731)
-0.057 (-0.998)

0.010 (0.179)
0.100 (1.765)
-0.048 (-0.836)

0.247 (4.268)***

0.150 (2.601)**
0.323 (5.606)***

0.128 (2.154)*
0.341 (5.813)***

Interaction
Partner Information
Visibility*Strategic IIS
Adj. R2
R2 change
F change

Model 3
β (T-value)

0.088 (1.545)
0.057
0.07
5.301***

0.149
0.161
13.480***

0.153
0.171
9.595***

Dependent Variable: SN Performance
*p<.05, **p<.01, *** p<.001

Although the variance explained by the model increases slightly from 14.9% to 15.3%
when the interaction term is added to the regression model, the beta coefficient for the interaction
term is not statistically significant. Thus the results do not support our hypothesis concerning the
moderating role of the partner information visibility variable.
For hypothesis 6b we postulated that there would be a stronger positive association
between strategic IIS and the performance of a SN with high variability (i.e. uncertainty) in
supplier capability than with low variability in supplier capability. Table 5-18 presents the
results.
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Table 5-18. Results of Regression Analysis: Effects of Strategic IIS and Variability in
Supplier Capability on Supply Network Performance (standardized beta coefficients)

Variables

Control variables
Industry
Years with partner
Firm size
Independent variables
Strategic IIS
Variability in Supplier
Capability

Model 1
β (T-value)
Controls

Model 2
β (T-value)
w/Independent
variables

w/Interactions

0.011 (0.189)
0.106 (1.775)
-0.032 (-0.527)

-0.028 (-0.543)
0.059 (1.110)
-0.070 (-1.300)

-0.020 (-0.388)
0.060 (1.1125)
-0.059 (-1.091)

0.247 (4.268)***

0.153 (2.907)**

0.125 (2.306)*

-0.464 (-8.751)***

-0.474 (-8.937)***

Interaction
Variability in Supplier
Capability x Strategic IIS
Adj. R2
R2 change
F change

Model 3
β (T-value)

-0.100 (-1.885)
0.057
0.07
5.301***

0.256
0.269
20.694***

0.263
0.278
17.994***

*p<.05, **p<.01, *** p<.001.

With the introduction of the variability in supplier capability term, the variance in SN
performance explained by the independent variables increases from 5.7% to 25.6%. As expected
when the variability in supplier capability is high, SN performance is low and vice versa. In
model 3, the interaction term explains only an additional 0.7% (over the variance in model 2) of
the variance in SN performance and is not statistically significant. Consequently we reject
hypothesis 6b.
Hypothesis 7b proposed that the positive relationship between operational IIS and the
performance of the supply network is stronger in a SN with high process uncertainty than one
with low process uncertainty. The results of our regression analysis are presented in Table 5-19
in which the standardized coefficients and t-values, shown in parenthesis, are reported.
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Table 5-19. Results of Regression Analysis: Effects of Operational IIS and Process
Uncertainty on Supply Network Performance (standardized beta coefficients)
Variables

Control variables
Industry
Years with partner
Firm Size
Independent variables
Operational IIS
Process Uncertainty

Model 1
β (T-value)
Base Model

Model 2
β (T-value)
w/moderator variable

Model 3
β (T-value)
w/Interaction

0.035 (0.642)
0.081 (1.401)
-0.016 (-0.275)

0.028 (0.519)
0.088 (1.531)
-0.022 (-0.392)

0.033 (0.619)
0.076 (1.320)
-0.022 (-.384)

0.215 (3.872)***

0.215 (3.896)***
-0.127 (-2.339)*

0.228 (4.142 )***
-0.123 (2.271)*

Interaction
Process Uncertainty x
Operational IIS
Adj. R2
R2 change
F change

0.128(2.348)*
0.046
0.058
4.874***

0.060
0.074
5.049***

0.073
0.090
5.186***

Dependent Variable: SN Performance
*p<.05, **p<.01, *** p<.005.

The results show a significant change in the adjusted R2 values, first when the process
uncertainty variable is added and then again when the interaction term is added. There is a
positive and statistically significant relationship between operational IIS and SN Performance
and also when process uncertainty is added in model 2. Additionally, we note that process
uncertainty positively moderates the relationship between operational IIS and SN performance
and is statistically significant (β=0.128, p=0.019).
To assist in further explaining the nature of the interaction effect we examine the
interaction plot shown in figure 9. In this plot, values of one standard deviation below (low
process uncertainty) and one standard deviation above (high process uncertainty) the mean are
assigned to the interaction of process uncertainty and operational IIS.
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Interaction Plot - IIS and SN Performance by
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Figure 9. Interaction Plot

The lack of parallelism in the interaction plots is consistent with the results from the regression
analysis where the interaction term is significant. The slope, when there is high process
uncertainty, is much greater than the slope when there is low process uncertainty. Thus more
performance benefits are gained from operational IIS when there is high process uncertainty than
when process uncertainty is low. These results provide evidence to support hypothesis 7b.
Hypothesis 7c proposed that the positive relationship between strategic IIS and the
performance of the supply network is stronger in a SN with high process uncertainty than one
with low process uncertainty. The results of our regression analysis are presented in Table 5-20
in which the standardized coefficients and t-values, shown in parenthesis, are reported.
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Table 5-20. Results of Regression Analysis: Effects of Strategic IIS and Process
Uncertainty on Supply Network Performance (standardized beta coefficients)
Variables

Control variables
Industry
Years with partner
Firm Size
Independent variables
Strategic IIS
Process Uncertainty

Model 1
β (T-value)
Base Model

Model 2
β (T-value)
w/moderator
variable

Model 3
β (T-value)
w/Interaction

0.011 (1.891)
0.106 (1.775)
-0.032 (-0.527)

0.006 (0.113)
0116 (1.935)
-0.043 (-0.709)

0.010 (0.169)
0.104 (1.736)
-0.037 (-0.610)

0.247 (4.268)***

0.255 (4.420)***
-0.122 (-2.124)*

0.262 (4.551)***
-0.128 (-2.225)*

Interaction
Process Uncertainty x
Strategic IIS
Adj. R2
R2 change
F change

0.098 (1.700)
0.057
0.070
5.301***

0.068
0.085
5.196***

0.075
0.094
4.840***

Dependent Variable: SN Performance
*p<.05, **p<.01, *** p<.005.

Here the change in adjusted R2 is very small and the interaction is not statistically significant,
p=.090, so hypothesis 7c is rejected.

Hypotheses were not developed for the relationship between IIS and SN performance but since
the interaction test associated with this relationship was statistically significant it is incumbent on
us to check these results. We state these hypotheses as follows:

Hypothesis 8a: The higher the strategic IIS, the higher the SN Performance.
Hypothesis 8b: The higher the operational IIS, the higher the SN Performance.
Hypothesis 8c: The higher the IIS (both strategic and operational IIS, the higher the SN
Performance.
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A summary of the results associated with hypotheses 8a, 8b and 8c is presented in Table 5-21.
Table 5-21.

Results of Regression Analysis for IIS on Performance

Variable
Both Operational
and Strategic IIS
Strategic IIS
Operational IIS

β
.176

t
3.288***

Adj R2
.030

.123
.214

2.271*
4.112***

.014
.046

Dependent variable: SN Performance

*p<.05, **p<.01, *** p<.005

A summary of the results of all the hypotheses is presented in Table 5-22.

Table 5- 22. Summary of the Results
Relationship
Dyadic SN <---> Type 4 IIS
Multiple Dyadic <---> Type 1 IIS
Stages <---> Frequency Operational IIS
Location <---> Types 1 & 4 IIS
Coordination Structure <---> Strategic IIS (Dyadic SN)
Coordination Structure <---> Freq. Operational IIS (Multi. Dyadic SN)
Partner Information Visibility ---> Performance
Variability Supplier Capability ---> Performance
Process Uncertainty ---> Performance

Hypothesis
H1a
H1b
H2
H3a, H3b
H4a
H4b
H5a
H6a
H7a

Findings
Supported
Supported
Not Tested
Not Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported

Moderation
StagesxCoordination Structure ---> Frequency Operational IIS
Partner Information Visibility x Operational IIS ---> SN Performance
Partner Information Visibility x Strategic IIS ---> SN Performance
Variability in Supplier Capability x Strategic IIS ---> SN Performance
Process Uncertainty x Operational IIS ---> SN Performance
Process Uncertainty x Strategic IIS ---> SN Performance

H4c
H5b
H5c
H6b
H7b
H7c

Not Tested
Not Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Supported
Not Supported

Additional Hypotheses (not developed but form part of the interaction analysis)
Operational IIS ----> Performance
H8a
Strategic IIS ---> Performance
H8b
IIS (Operational and Strategic) ---> Performance
H8c
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Supported
Supported
Supported

6.

DISCUSSION

In this manuscript we explored the relationship between supply network configuration and IIS,
classified as a two-dimensional construct in terms of the type of IIS and the frequency with
which information is shared, and how it is impacted by different coordination structures. Our
motivation was largely driven by Storey’s (2002) appeal for pragmatic approaches that focus on
some of the challenges faced in managing supply networks. In keeping with his suggestion for
further study on topics such as the structure, and processes associated with supply chain
management we sought to:
•

Add some clarity to the ambiguous findings in the literature on the effect that IIS has on
the performance of supply networks,

•

Investigate how critical factors such as process and partner uncertainty affect the
relationship between IIS and performance and

•

Examine the role of the coordination structure as it relates to the SN pattern and IIS.
Drawing on the marketing, operations, strategy and information management literature, a

theoretical model was developed utilizing transaction cost economics and social network
theories. Such an integrative approach offered the potential for a richer understanding of the
factors in our model. The proposed model was empirically validated in a cross-sectional setting,
using a sampling frame randomly selected and comprised of supply management executives
from various industries within the United States.
Our findings and their implication for academicians and practitioners are discussed in the
following sections.
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6.1

Findings

6.1.1

Performance and Information Sharing
Extant literature on information sharing and performance has been ambiguous. As

discussed earlier, information sharing has been shown to lead to higher performance (Carr et al.
1999; Dyer 1996; Jap 2001), or incremental performance gains (Cachon et al. 2000) or no gains
at all (Graves 1999).
It has been suggested, that the greatest benefits from inter-organizational information
sharing are obtained when firms work collaboratively rather than by merely engaging in
information transfer between parties (Kulp et al. 2004).
Our observations corroborate findings that report a positive relationship between IIS and
performance. We go a step further in this study by identifying the nature of the IIS associated
with SN performance. The results indicate that operational IIS and strategic IIS are positively
related to SN performance individually and collectively. Operational IIS can help with
scheduling and inventory planning so as to gain efficiencies in the supply network for both the
buyer and the supplier, thus allowing firms to have a leaner and more agile operation. Strategic
IIS is also important to the transacting parties particularly for firms that are involved in
collaborative relationships.
From our analysis we observe that the variance in SN performance explained by
operational IIS and strategic IIS, when considered either separately or jointly, is less than 10%. A
possible reason could be that performance increases normally attributed to information sharing
may stem from causes other than those included in our model. For example, Carr and Kaynak
(2007) attribute some of the financial performance gains for the buying firm to an indirect link
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from information sharing through other supply chain initiatives such as product quality
improvements.
To help us better understand the IIS-to-performance link, we discuss in section 6.1.4 the
moderating effect of uncertainty on the relationship between IIS and SN Performance.

6.1.2

Performance and Partner Uncertainty
The Transaction Cost Economics literature and agency theory provide some guidance on

how to interpret the direct relationship found between performance and two characteristics of
partner uncertainty: partner information visibility and variability in supplier capability.
There is often a lack of goal congruence in buyer/supplier relationships involving firms
with low partner information visibility. While the goal of the buyer is typically to find suppliers
who can provide cost effective products, the suppliers in those relationships are more interested
in deals that return high profit margins (Jap 2001). In the absence of common goals firms are
more likely to act in their own self interest (Jensen et al. 1976), resulting in information
asymmetry which can then lead to opportunistic behavior. There is high transaction costs
associated with opportunistic behavior as it is more difficult to coordinate activities without
having the requisite information, which ultimately leads to sub-optimal performance (Jap 2001).
On the contrary, firms that have high partner information visibility are more likely to
have common goals and this will motivate them to share information among their members.
With high partner information visibility, transaction costs are lowered, transaction value
enhanced (Dyer 1997) and relational rents generated (Anderson et al. 1990). Accordingly the
observed direct and positive relationship between partner information visibility and SN
performance is supported by extant literature.
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With respect to variability in supplier capability, a buying firm relies on the supplier to a
large extent to maintain a competitive position (Monczka et al. 1993) so it is important that the
suppliers have the capability to satisfy the needs of the buying firm. According to Handfield et al
“One of the most important activities in the new development process is understanding
the focal suppliers' capabilities and design expertise, conducting a technology risk assessment,
and weighing the risks against the probability of success.” (Handfield et al. 1999b)
One can then assume that a firm that is unable to assess the capability of a supplier
partner would likely be reluctant to involve that supplier in a new product development project
that may require specialized skills to cope with new technology, for instance. While quality
initiatives, supplier development programs and collaborative relationships are instrumental to
improving the supplier capability (Monczka et al. 1993), the buying firm may instead decide to
work with an alternative partner that has the necessary skills (Handfield et al. 2007). High
switching costs will result from using an alternative supplier in cases where idiosyncratic assets
are already in place.
Conversely, with low variability in supplier capability, a buying firm is fully cognizant of
the supplier’s skills and resources and can put the requisite plans in place to address any
inadequacies of the supplier. The firm will therefore be more willing to integrate the supplier in
the design phase for new products. Potential benefits from early supplier involvement normally
include reduced costs, reduced time to market, and higher quality products (Handfield et al.
1999b) which lead to performance gains and ultimately, more satisfied customers. Thus, the
positive relationship between variability in supplier capability and SN performance is not
surprising.
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6.1.3

SN Performance and Process Uncertainty
According to (Hopp et al. 2004), process uncertainty can be reduced by introducing

flexibility into processes and internal control systems. The manner in which this flexibility is
introduced will then become very important. Miller and Dröge (1986) suggests that firms can
respond more readily to uncertainty when lower levels of a firm’s hierarchy are allowed to make
decisions.
One problem with using lower level staff, however, is that that the firm’s ability to handle
some issues may be diluted owing to the wide range and often conflicting responses received
from these lower level staff (Iyer et al. 2004) who may not be as experienced or have all the
expertise to handle a more centralized problem. Such inefficiencies will drive up transaction
costs and result in lower performance returns. Based on these arguments there is merit in the
findings that there is a direct but negative relationship between process uncertainty and SN
performance.

6.1.4

SN Performance, IIS and the Quasi-Moderators
Of the three moderators (process uncertainty, partner information-visibility, and

variability in supplier capability) only process uncertainty showed a significant moderation effect
for the relationship between IIS and SN performance in the case of operational IIS.
Given the finding that process uncertainty has no impact on the relationship between
strategic IIS and SN performance but has influence when the IIS is operational, we conjecture
that since process uncertainty is focused primarily on current issues such as machine breakdowns
and delivery delays the greatest influence will be on operational IIS. To effectively manage
process uncertainty will require more operational IIS to garner SN performance gains.
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Turning to variability in partner capability, the literature suggests that when variability in
supplier capability is high, suboptimal decisions result and these can be costly to the firms in the
network. Since the variability in supplier capability is looking at future expectations it would not
have much influence on the relationship between operational IIS and Performance. Although not
reported in our results, our analysis confirmed that belief. However the lack of influence that the
variability in supplier capability has on the relationship between strategic IIS and performance
was unexpected. One plausible explanation for this is that firms after assessing the risk of
continuing a relationship with a supplier that has low supplier capability opts instead to
outsource to alternative suppliers. This may be attributable to the inability of firms to properly
assess supplier capabilities (Handfield et al. 2007) or their unwillingness to institute supplier
development programs and other initiatives to upgrade the skills and resources of the supplier.
Finally partner information visibility also did not have any significant influence on the
relationship between IIS and SN performance as expected. With high partner information
visibility, the literature on agency theory suggests that firms would tend to withhold information
and behave opportunistically. While firms may not be willing to share the information that they
possess, the trading partner may have found alternative sources to get that information or be
working with similar firms so that their reliance on the firm that is withholding information is
substantially diminished.

6.1.5

IIS, Supply Network Configuration and Coordination Structure
Several studies on supply network structure (Beamon 1998; Choi et al. 2002; Fisher

1997; Harland et al. 2001) have been conducted, but how it relates to IIS has not, to my
knowledge, been empirically established in the literature. Some researchers (Lee et al. 2000b)
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have noted the lack of empirical research on information sharing in supply networks with most
of the work examined from a theoretical perspective.
Our empirical analysis provides some significant insights into how the configuration of
the supply network is related to IIS. Our findings that dyadic supply networks are associated with
Type 4 (strategic, high frequency) IIS while multiple dyadic networks are associated with Type 1
(operational, low frequency) IIS are consistent with the tenets of social network and TCE
theories. The interdependence and the strong ties existing in a dyadic network foster Type 4 IIS.
In the multiple dyadic networks where tie strength is much weaker and relationships are
primarily governed by market transactions, Type 1 IIS is the more likely outcome. Since both
operational and strategic IIS increase performance and the appropriate type of IIS changes
depending on the SN configuration, it is likely that the SN configuration also affects the SN
performance. Such conjectures await future research however.
One of the other dimensions of the supply network configuration is the location of the
firm in the network. The literature on the “bull whip” effect (Lee et al. 1997b) and on
“clockspeed” (Fine 1998) illuminated our discourse and postulates as it relates to firm location.
Contrary to our hypotheses that firms located close to the consumer would engage in Type 4 IIS
and those close to the initial source of material would engage in Type 1 IIS, our finding of Type
1 IIS irrespective of the firm location was initially a bit surprising. However, in retrospect there
is a plausible explanation for this discrepancy.
The complexity of a network can be partially attributed to how the firms are linked (Choi
et al., 2001). As the complexity of such networks increase from dyadic to multiple dyadic they
will require more interaction with others in the network in order to coordinate the various
activities that are involved in accomplishing day-to-day tasks efficiently. In such an environment
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firms will share operational IIS. Complex networks can exist anywhere along the continuum
from the initial raw material supplier to the consumer. Thus while the location of the firm can be
an important consideration in determining the type of IIS, the complexity of the network is a
more compelling determinant and so takes precedence.
In terms of the coordination structure, results show that firms in a single stage dyadic
network that have a centralized coordination structure are more likely to share strategic IIS than
those in a decentralized coordination structure. This corroborates with our hypotheses where we
expect that there will be more strategic IIS in the centralized coordination structure since in that
case the decisions made have significant impact on both the buyer and the supplier. This is quite
different from a decentralized coordination structure were control is more localized. With respect
to the multiple dyadic networks, as expected, frequent operational IIS is required to successfully
manage the many rules and procedures. These are used to control and maintain orderliness in the
day-to-day activities of multiple firms in a centralized coordination structure more so than with a
decentralized coordination structure where the focus is on responsiveness to local changes (Choi
et al. 2002).

6.2

Theoretical Contributions
This dissertation makes several contributions to academic inquiry. Our study increases

the understanding of how structural factors can affect IIS by developing a framework that
integrates the design of the supply network with IIS. Research has been conducted separately on
supply network design and on IIS but how these two are related has not been established. To
advance the study of IIS, a theoretical framework is developed in which links between key
characteristics of supply network configuration and IIS are investigated.
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Enhancements to understanding the influence of the supply network design on IIS are
provided by associating different types of IIS with the appropriate supply network design. The
finding of a significant association between the network pattern and the type of IIS constitutes a
significant contribution to, and extension of the current literature in supply chain management.
Thus Type 4 IIS is expected to dominate in dyadic networks and Type 1 IIS in multiple dyadic
networks. In much of the prior literature, IIS is narrowly construed in terms of either the scale
(Gavirneni et al. 1999) or scope (Seidmann et al. 1998) of information shared, neither of which
are adequate.
Our model also extends the parameters under inquiry to include an investigation of how
performance is impacted when the information shared is constrained by uncertainty and how
coordination structure can influence the Type of IIS in the SN.
Finally, this study adds to the scant body of empirical research on networks. Traditionally
IIS in supply networks has been studied primarily with respect to the supplier or the buyer and
less frequently the buyer-supplier dyad. The problem with taking these perspectives is that
findings cannot always be assumed to inductively apply to supply networks, thus compromising
the efficacy of many studies. However, due to the complex and oftentimes dynamic nature of
supply networks there are only a few researchers that have ventured into empirical studies of
networks. We add to the limited research by utilizing a sampling frame that includes data on
product supply networks comprised of focal firms, and a downstream and an upstream partner
for each of those firms.
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6.3

Practical Implications
The findings from our research provide several managerial insights for practitioners on

information sharing in dyadic and multiple dyadic networks. Essential to the effective
management of the supply network is an understanding of the relationship between the types of
IIS and the design of the supply network. Prior to sharing information, firms need to decide not
only what to share but also how to share, decisions that can be more appropriately determined by
considering IIS in terms of two-dimensions comprised of the type of information shared and the
frequency with which information is shared (Samaddar et al. 2004).
Managers who are able to understand that the type of IIS that occurs will depend on how
the transacting parties are connected in the supply network, and are sensitive to the effect that
uncertainty has on performance can be more effective in developing and deploying their strategic
plans. Firms that can institute procedures aimed at reducing the uncertainties in their processes
and with their suppliers will be more likely to reap optimal benefits from their IIS endeavors.
These include reconfiguring the SN, improving the communication channels, instituting supplier
development plans, supply councils and guest engineer programs where applicable to increase
the capability of their suppliers and develop trust within their networks.

6.4

Limitations and Future Research

We acknowledge some limitations of our study that can be useful in guiding future research
activities.
Our sample population comprised only those in a manufacturing network so there may be
limited generalizability to other types of industries. Additionally we used only a single informant
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to gather the information on the buyer and the supplier which gives a one sided view that could
lead to inherent biases even though several steps were taken to mitigate this effect.
Another limitation is the cross-sectional nature of our study. A longitudinal study would
be helpful to determine if, over time, the type of IIS changes for a particular SN configuration or
if there is a different type of IIS when the SN configuration changes.
Future research should expand the data collection to include the buyer’s and supplier’s
perspective so that we can get a more balanced view and be able to fully examine the nature of
the relationship. A study that examines our model across other sectors such as the public sector
or different countries may also be instructive given today’s global environment.
Additionally, future research should look at the different types of IIS to answer questions
such as ‘does the sharing of promotional strategies provide greater performance improvements
than other types of strategic IIS?’ Another area for future research is to explore if there are
differences in the IIS dynamics between the upstream and downstream portions of the product
supply network. These two areas will provide some finer grained information that can help us get
a better understanding of some of the intricacies associated with IIS.
Finally future research can investigate the performance of the buyer and the firm
separately and compare that to the performance of the supply network.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned limitations we believe that this manuscript makes a
compelling case for the structure/process/outcome model linking the supply network
configuration to IIS and in turn, to Performance.
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6.5

Conclusion
Despite burgeoning literature on IIS, the guiding principles that are essential to an

understanding of this process are still evolving. Several researchers have expounded the benefits
of IIS to the overall supply network. Yet the “emergent, dynamic and unpredictable” nature of
supply networks (Choi et al. 2001) presents challenges for organizations and oftentimes the
purported benefits do not materialize.
Many managers are unsure on how best to leverage their resources so that they can
capitalize on the information sharing opportunities that are available. Our research study, in
addition to its theoretical contributions, moved towards filling this gap by suggesting that
structural factors, such as the design of the supply network, play a significant role in facilitating
IIS. Additionally the role of the coordination structure and its influence on the type of IIS in a
SN were investigated. We also added some clarity on how IIS can impact performance by
identifying some uncertainty conditions that can determine whether or not performance benefits
accrue to the supply network. From our exploration emerged a clearer picture of some of the
dynamics associated with a supply network. An understanding of these issues can help propel
organizations and guide managers on how best to navigate the complex and fast moving
environment within which they operate.
Transaction cost economics and social network theories provided the theoretical lens for
our study. Cross-sectional data collected from manufacturing industries validated our assertions
that the structure of the supply network plays a part in the type of information shared and
corroborated other research findings, that IIS can improve performance.
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APPENDIX A –Typology of IIS (Samaddar et al. 2004)
New Typology of IIS
To reduce uncertainty or the ill effects of uncertainty, firms need to interact frequently,
which requires sharing of information. While the degree of interaction, which can be interpreted
as frequency of sharing, is important, the quality or richness of information shared is also
important (Daft et al. 1986). Even though the scope of the information does not mean richness of
the information, most of operational information is less rich than strategic information as
mentioned. Therefore, by knowing the scope of information, it is possible to guess the richness
of information. Scale-based IIS types focus only on quantity of information shared, not quality of
information shared. In contrast, scope-based IIS types focus only on quality of information,
which misses the frequency of interaction. Clearly, the uni-dimensional IIS typology is not an
effective way of classifying various forms of IIS. As a result, we propose a new typology of IIS
by using two dimensions: frequency and scope. We represent the decision of ‘what to share’ by
the scope of the information (operational vs. strategic), and the decision of ‘how to share’ by the
frequency of information sharing (low vs. high). Both dimensions are needed to gain a more
comprehensive understanding of IIS strategies than what is afforded by the literature. This twodimensional framework is presented in the table below.
Type

Operational

Strategic

Type I

Type 3

Lower information cost

Low information cost

Low concern about security
and proprietary information

High concern about security
and proprietary information

Type 2

Type 4

High information cost

Higher information cost

Low concern about security
and proprietary information

High concern about security
and proprietary information

Frequency

Low

High

Table A -1. Typology of IIS

In this framework, Type 1 (Type 2) IIS has a capability of sharing operational
information with low (high) frequency. Similarly, Type 3 (Type 4) has a capability of sharing
strategic information with low (high) frequency. Note that operational (Type 1 and 2) IIS deals
with mostly quantitative and simple data and information. On the contrary, strategic (Type 3 and
4) IIS deals with mostly qualitative information and knowledge. In this typology strategic
information include operational information, and high frequency sharing also includes low
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frequency sharing. That is, for example, it is possible to do Type 1 IIS using Type 2 IIS.
However, having Type 2 IIS in the place of Type 1 IIS will create higher cost (for example,
information cost) than the case of having appropriate type of IIS (i.e., Type 1). In this paper, we
define information costs as the combined costs associated with acquiring information, processing
the acquired information, and building and maintaining system(s) that facilitate information
sharing. To facilitate information flow, supply network can implement various information
system such as direct connect, outsourcing or third party provider of information system
(Premkumar 2000); Each of these options has pros and cons. As cost-effective information
system is one of the key drivers of supply network management (Lee et al. 2000b), identifying
appropriate types of IIS is important task when the organization design and manage the supply
network. By knowing what type of information sharing is required, the organizations can build
appropriate information system.

Low frequency/operational IIS (Type 1)
Type 1 IIS involves the occasional sharing of information. Tasks that impact transacting
parties are normally well-structured with standardized procedures for handling activities so that
information only needs to be shared when there are exceptions, which occurs seldom. Under
these circumstances, coordination costs, which are associated with managing interdependent
activities, are low as there is very little need for operational information to be shared regularly to
facilitate task completion. Decision rights are often decentralized for the well-structured task or
process, and frequent information sharing is not required in those situations (Anand et al. 1997).
There are also few exceptions in the process or task, and therefore entities can rely primarily on
local knowledge and information to make decisions. As a result, Type 1 IIS is often employed in
decentralized decision structures, where information costs are low (Anand et al. 1997).
With Type 1 IIS there is often no need for advanced IT to transmit information owing to
the low frequency of information sharing and the nature of information. As a consequence there
is more flexibility with the communication media that can be utilized. In situations where simple
technology, such as FAX and e-mail can be used, implementation costs are expected to be low.
Owing to the short-term nature of operational decisions and the ease with which actions
taken can be reversed (Hitt et al. 1999), firms are not that concerned with information leakage to
potential competitors. Therefore security and proprietary concerns with respect to the
information shared tend to be low.
High frequency/operational IIS (Type 2)
In Type 2 IIS, information is shared on a recurrent basis to facilitate activities such as
production planning, or delivery scheduling. Although these tasks are well-structured and are not
complex, they are sensitive to many disturbances (or uncertainties) both those internal and
external to the supply network. The use of automated systems is prevalent in these situations in
order to handle the flow of information in a timely manner and with a high degree of accuracy.
For instance, at Chrysler where frequent and accurate communication was required between the
assembly plants and suppliers, the implementation of EDI allowed suppliers to obtain real time
information on the precise requirements of the assembly plants and, in turn, to provide the plants
with advance shipping notices (Mukhopadhyay et al. 1995).
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Even with frequent information sharing in this type of IIS, much of the information
sharing can be handled using automated systems, because the information shared tends to be
well-structured and quantitative. Therefore, human intervention can often be avoided. This
allows transacting agents to switch their focus from regulating operational exchanges to
concentrating on other cooperative activities with their partners (Bensaou 1997).
The information costs associated with Type 2 IIS will be higher than for Type 1 owing to
the potential need for automated systems in the former. In the absence of an automated system
more human resources have to be used for Type 2 to regulate high frequency exchanges, which
increases the information costs due to high processing cost. In addition, unlike Type 1 IIS, high
frequency information sharing is often found where decision rights are centralized and this also
leads to high information cost (Anand et al. 1997). Security and proprietary concern are also low
owing to the nature of the information shared.

Low frequency/strategic IIS (Type 3)
Type 3 IIS is used to assist various strategic decisions in cases where information sharing
is needed infrequently, which often means that information shared requires less interaction.
However, due to its nature, which is often qualitative and non-standardized, strategic information
is not as suitable for automation as operational information. Also, common language between
transacting parties about the information shared is required to interpret such information and use
it uniformly towards decision making [reference]. Such language is needed to share and integrate
aspects of knowledge [and information] that is not common between individuals (Grant 1996).
Without common knowledge, parties have no choice but to share information frequently in order
to alleviate misunderstanding. Thus, a necessary condition for Type 3 IIS is a common language
between source and recipient. Note, however, that it is possible to have frequent information
sharing (i.e., Type 4 IIS) even with the presence of common knowledge between firms. For
example, if high interaction is required for a certain task (such as innovative new product
development), then even with the presence of common language parties will share information
more frequently. Where parties are in the same industry and have a long history of relationship
they are more prone to have this common language.
Similar to Type 1, Type 3 IIS is more suitable where decision rights are decentralized
because the frequency of information sharing is low (Anand et al. 1997). Thus information costs
are low. In general, sharing strategic information is more difficult than operational information
because it requires a richer communication media (Daft et al. 1986). Therefore information costs
are higher for Type 3 than for Type 1 and Type 2.
Strategic decisions usually make a significant contribution to the overall success of the
organization and can have far reaching implications. Owing to the long-term nature of such
decisions and the difficulty to reverse any action taken, firms need to institute protective
measures to safeguard their information from potential competitors. As a result, these types of
information have a higher concern about security and proprietary issues compared to operational
information. Even with commonalities, fear of information leakage will make parties share
strategic information infrequently(Seidmann et al. 1998).
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High frequency/strategic IIS (Type 4)
Type 4 IIS involves recurrent information flow between parties. This occurs in
collaborative endeavors where timely information is critical to the completion of the activity. In
addition, frequent information exchange is often required in order to obtain accurate
interpretation (due to the lack of common language or to the novel technologies used) of
strategic information and to ensure effective coordination with all the relevant parties.
For example, consumer demand is often forecasted jointly by manufacturers and retailers
such as Wal-mart and Target using collaborative planning, forecasting and replenishment
(CPFAR) initiatives (Kiely 1998). The key characteristics of CPFAR are the sharing of real-time
inventory data by retailers with manufacturers allowing forecasts to be developed in a timely
manner and continuous replenishment of retailer inventory by manufacturers. Even though
forecasting customer demand can be considered simple, each firm may have different formulas,
safety stock requirement, etc. (i.e., lack of common languages) This forces the firms to have
more interaction, thus frequent recurrent information exchange, to ensure correct understanding
of strategic information (e.g., forecasting formulas or safety stock requirement) provided.
In many of these collaborative ventures, IT often plays a critical role (Premkumar 2000),
since the information in Type 4, unlike Types 1 and 2, is often complex and requires rich
communication media such as face-to-face meeting or video conferencing (Roberts 2000).
Potential drawbacks could exist at many levels, such as high security and proprietary concern
and poor standard of communication. Of all four types of IIS, Type 4 IIS has the highest
information costs due to the combination of high frequency and the nature of the information,
which requires common language for interpretation (Choudhury et al. 1997)
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APPENDIX B – SURVEY
B1. Introduction to Survey
You are invited to participate in our survey on Information Sharing between firms in supply networks. In this
survey, you will be asked to pick one top tier supplier (e.g. S1) and one top tier customer (e.g. C1), as shown below,
who are external to your firm and with whom your firm transacts directly.

The supplier and customer selected must be part of the same supply network. Thus an item (e.g.
product/part/subassembly) bought from supplier S1 must be used to produce an item sold to customer C1.
Section 1 of this questionnaire focuses on the relationship between your firm and one supplier (the link between S1
and your firm). Section 2 focuses on the relationship between your firm and one customer (the link between your
firm and C1).
In section 3 we focus on the supply network as shown below:

Here we are interested in all the immediate suppliers and customers that your firm transacts with for the item
referenced in sections 1 and 2.
It will take approximately 15-20 minutes to complete the questionnaire.
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. There are no foreseeable risks associated with this project.
However, if you feel uncomfortable answering any questions, you can withdraw from the survey at any point. Please
answer all questions as completely as possible in order to facilitate a comprehensive analysis of the data. Feel free to
consult with the relevant persons in your firm if you do not have all the information necessary to answer a question.
Your survey responses will be strictly confidential and data from this research will be reported only in the aggregate.
Your information will be coded and will remain confidential.
If you have questions at any time about the survey or the procedures, you may contact Marcia Daley at 404 2172889 or by email at mdawnja@aol.com.
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Thank you very much for your time and support. Please start with the survey now by clicking on the Continue
button below.

B.2.

Qualifying question (Qualify)

On average, how much of your time do you spend on activities and decision-making issues related to your firm’s
supply networks (suppliers, customers)?
1) 0-10% 2) 11-20% 3) 21-30% 4) 31-40%
5)41-50%
6) 51-60%
7) 61-70% 8) 71-80% 9)
>80%

B3. MEASUREMENT ITEMS
SECTION 1 - YOUR SUPPLIER
Consider a supplier that provides your firm with an item (e.g. material/part/ subassembly) used to generate a
significant portion of your firms revenue. Please respond to the following questions and statements in reference to
this supplier.
Years Working with Supplier – (YRSWS)
How long has your firm been doing business with this supplier? (Check one)
1. Not Applicable
2. Less than 1 year
3. 1-3 years
4. 4-5 years
5. 6-10 years
6. More than 10 years
Operational Information Sharing
(Seven-point Likert scale: Strongly Disagree / Strongly Agree)
Your firm shares the following operational information with this supplier:
1. Production schedules. (SOIS1)
2. Advanced shipping notices. (SOIS2)
3. Order status. (SOIS3)
4. Inventory levels. (SOIS4)
Frequency of Operational Information Sharing – (SOISF)
In general, how frequently does your firm share operational information with this supplier?
1. Not Applicable
2. Never
3. Rarely
4. Most months within a year
5. 1-3 times/month
6. Weekly
7. Most days
Strategic Information Sharing
(Seven-point Likert scale: Strongly Disagree / Strongly Agree)
Your firm shares the following strategic information with this supplier:
1. Target markets. (SSIS1)
2. Product development. (SSIS2)
3. Distribution strategies. (SSIS3)
4. Promotional strategies. (SSIS4)
- 140 -

5.
6.
7.
8.

Facility layout. (SSIS5)
Capacity planning. (SSIS6)
Sourcing plans. (SSIS7)
Research. (SSIS8)

Frequency of Strategic Information Sharing ( SSISF)
In general, how frequently does your firm share strategic information with this supplier?
1. Not Applicable
2. Never
3. Rarely
4. Most months within a year
5. 1-3 times/month
6. Weekly
7. Most days
Supplier Partner Information Visibility
(Seven-point Likert scale: Strongly Disagree / Strongly Agree)
We are interested in determining if the information that this supplier shares with you is useful for assessing its
operations. Please select the response that best describes the extent to which you disagree or agree with the
following statements.
1. The information received from this supplier is generally accurate. (SPII1)
2. The information received from this supplier is generally timely. (SPII2)
3. Based on our past experience, the information received from this supplier is normally adequate to assess its
operations. (SPII3)
Variability in Supplier Capability*
We are interested in determining this supplier’s ability to deliver on time and with acceptable quality. Please select
the response that best describes the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements
(Seven-point Likert scale: Strongly Disagree / Strongly Agree)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

This supplier has the resources (e.g. skill level of workforce, plant capacity, manpower) to deliver in a
timely manner even if there are significant product/component changes. (SVPC1)
The quality of work received from this supplier will not deteriorate, even if there is significant product, or
component changes. (SVPC2)
This supplier has the resources to deliver in a timely manner despite significant process changes. (SVPC3)
The quality of work received from this supplier will not deteriorate with significant process changes.
(SVPC4)
This supplier has the resources to deliver in a timely manner despite significant technology interface
changes. (SVPC5)
The quality of work received from this supplier will not deteriorate despite significant technology interface
changes. (SVPC6)

*Reverse coded - High values indicate low variability (low uncertainty)
Supplier Performance
(Seven-point Likert scale: Greatly Below Average / Greatly Above Average)
Please rate your supplier’s performance with respect to the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Delivery performance to commit date. (SDREL1)
Fill rate. (SDREL2)
Customer satisfaction with orders. (SDREL3)
Order fulfillment lead times. (SDRESP)
Responsiveness to changes in customer demand (SFLEX)
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SECTION 2 - YOUR CUSTOMER
Consider now a top-tier customer who purchases a significant amount of an item (e.g. product/part/subassembly)
from your firm. Note: This customer must be one for whom the item referenced in section 1 is required in order to
fulfill its orders.
Please respond to the following questions and statements in reference to this customer.
How long has your firm been doing business with this customer? (Check one) (YRSWC)
1. Less than 1 year
2. 1-3 years
3. 4-5 years
4. 6-10 years
5. More than 10 years
Location of the Customer in the Supply Network (CLOC)
Please select one of the following to describe the position of this customer in the supply network
1. Raw material Distributor
2. Intermediate product/part/subassembly Manufacturer
3. Intermediate product/part/subassembly Distributor
4. Final product Manufacturer
5. Wholesaler/Distributor
6. Retailer/Distributor to the public
7. Consumer
8. Other
Operational Information Sharing
(Seven-point Likert scale: Strongly Disagree / Strongly Agree)
Your firm shares the following operational information with this customer:
1. Production schedules. (COIS1)
2. Advanced shipping notices. (COIS2)
3. Order status. (COIS3)
4. Inventory levels. (COIS4)
Frequency of Operational Information Sharing (COISF)
In general, how frequently does your firm share operational information with this customer?
1. Not Applicable
2. Never
3. Rarely
4. Most months within a year
5. 1-3 times/month
6. Weekly
7. Most days
Strategic Information Sharing
(Seven-point Likert scale: Strongly Disagree / Strongly Agree)
Your firm shares the following strategic information with this supplier:
1. Target markets. (CSIS1)
2. Product development. (CSIS2)
3. Distribution strategies. (CSIS3)
4. Promotional strategies. (CSIS4)
5. Facility layout. (CSIS5)
6. Capacity planning. (CSIS6)
7. Sourcing plans. (CSIS7)
8. Research. (CSIS8)
- 142 -

Frequency of Strategic Information Sharing (CSISF)
In general, how frequently does your firm share strategic information with this customer?
1. Not Applicable
2. Never
3. Rarely
4. Most months within a year
5. 1-3 times/month
6. Weekly
7. Most days
Partner Information Visibility
(Seven-point Likert scale: Strongly Disagree / Strongly Agree)
We are interested in determining if the information that this customer shares with you is useful in assessing its
operations. Please select the response that best describes the extent to which you agree or disagree with the
following statements.
1. The information received from this supplier is generally accurate. (CPII1)
2. The information received from this supplier is generally timely. (CPII2)
3. Based on our past experience, the information received from this supplier is normally adequate to assess its
operations. (CPII3)
SECTION 3 - PRODUCT SUPPLY NETWORK
Focusing on the product supply network (see below) which includes all top tier suppliers and customers for the item
(e.g. material/part/subassembly) referenced in sections 1 and 2 of this questionnaire, please provide the following
information:

Please specify the number of top-tier suppliers that your firm transacts with for this item ___________ (NumTTS)

Please specify the number of top-tier customers that your firm transacts with (those for whom this item is required in
order for your firm to fulfill their orders) ____________ (Num TTC)

Please identify from the following, the position of your firm in the supply network for this item check one: (FLOC)
1. Raw material Manufacturer
2. Raw material Distributor
3. Intermediate product/part/subassembly Manufacturer
4. Intermediate product/part/subassembly Distributor
5. Final product Manufacturer
6. Wholesaler/Distributor
7. Retailer/Distributor to the public
8. Consumer
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Coordination Structure
(Seven-point Likert scale: Strongly Disagree / Strongly Agree)
Please select the response that best describes the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following
statements.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Supplier selection decisions are made by our firm without active involvement from any of our partners.
(CS1)
There is very little active involvement with our partners on product design matters. (CS2)
Our firm is free to make local adaptations to meet the needs of our clients. (CS3)
Our firm has the authority to make strategic decisions related to our activities in the supply network without
getting permission from our partners.(CS4)
Suggestions and recommendations made by our partners have to be considered when making strategic
decisions.(CS5)
Decision-making in this network is centralized.

The authority for making strategic decisions (check one): (CS7)
1. Resides in our firm
2. Is shared but our firm has more authority than our partner
3. Is shared equally between our firm and our partner
4. Is shared but our firm has less authority
5. Resides in our partners firm
SECTION 4 - YOUR FIRM
Focusing only on your firm, please respond to the following statements by selecting the most appropriate response
as it relates to the production time.
Process Uncertainty
With respect to production time, the duration of planned shutdown in our firm is typically: (PROCU1)
1. More than 10%
2. 6-10%
3. 1-5%
4. Less than 1%
With respect to production time, the duration of unplanned stoppages in our firm that significantly affect operations
is typically: (PROCU2)
1. More than 10%
2. 6-10%
3. 1-5%
4. less than 1%
Firm Performance
(Seven-point Likert scale: Greatly Below Average / Greatly Above Average)
Please rate your firm’s performance in the supply network relative to other firms in the same industry based on the
following:
1. Delivery performance to commit date. (FDREL1)
2. Fill rate. (FDREL2)
3. Customer satisfaction with orders. (FDREL3)
4. Delivery responsiveness (FDRESP)
5. Responsiveness to changes in customer requirements (FFLEX)
6. Value added per employee. (FCR1)
7. Cost of goods sold. (FCR2)
8. Warranties/returns processing costs (FCR3)
9. Cash-to-cash cycle time. (FAMF1)
10. Inventory days of supply. (FAMF2)
11. Net asset turns. (FAMF3)
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SECTION 5 - DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
The following information is needed for classification and comparison purposes only.
What is your position within this firm? (TITLE)
1. Partner/Owner
2. President/CEO
3. Chief Procurement Officer
4. COO
5. EVP/SVP
6. VP/Assistant VP/Principal
7. General Manager
8. Director/Assistant Director
9. Department Head
10. Purchasing Manager/ Senior Manager/ Senior Buyer
11. Assistant Manager/Buyer
12. Other __________________________________
How many years have you been working with this firm? (Check One) (YRSEXP)
1. Less than 5 years
2. 6-10 years
3. 11-15 years
4. 16-20 years
5. More than 20 years
Which of the following best describes the primary industry of your firm? (INDUS)
1. Textile
2. Automotive
3. Chemicals/Pharmaceuticals
4. Computer &Peripherals
5. Electronics
6. Food and Beverage
7. Telecommunications
8. Transportation
9. Semiconductor
10. Other ___________________________________
Please answer the following questions with your best estimate if exact data are not available.
Approximately how many people are employed in your firm? (NumEMP)
1. Less than 5 employees
2. 6-10 employees
3. 11-50 employees
4. 51-100 employees
5. 101-500 employees
6. 501-1000 employees
7. 1001-5000 employees
8. 5001-10000 employees
9. 10,000+ employees
What was the total dollar value of ALL items purchased in the last fiscal year? (PURCH)
1. Less than $10 million
2. $10 million to $49.9 million
3. $50 million to $99.9 million
4. $100 million to $499.9 million
5. $500 million to $999.9 million
6. $1 billion to $5 billion
7. Over $5 billion
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What was the total annual gross sales (dollars) for ALL items sold in the last fiscal year? (SALES)
1. Less than $10 million
2. $10 million to $49.9 million
3. $50 million to $99.9 million
4. $100 million to $499.9 million
5. $500 million to $999.9 million
6. $1 billion to $5 billion
7. Over $5 billion

Please note that all individual responses to this study will be kept strictly confidential. However if you would like to
receive the aggregate results, please complete the contact information below:
Email Address:
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